The Battle of Monmouth
Objectives:
·
SWBAT
identify the factors that eventually led to victory for the colonists in the
American Revolution.
·
SWBAT
demonstrate mastery of concepts through answering questions verbally,
whiteboard practice, and/or games.
Sources/Handouts
that will be used for discussion/evaluation for this lesson:
·
Source
#1 Monmouth Morning
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Source
#2 Monmouth Afternoon
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Source #3 Washington Rallying the Troops at
Monmouth; in 1857, Emanuel Leutze painted this for the Monmouth County Historical
Association.
·
Source #5 Matrix
·
Source #6 Pennsylvania Rifle – British Infantry Musket
Review—Key
Question (s):
·
What
did Washington hope to accomplish by bringing von Steuben to Valley Forge?
Suggested
Key Discussion Points/Questions:
·
Had
Washington been an effective military commander and motivator of his troops?
How had he become so popular?
The Battle of Monmouth
After
Valley Forge and Frederick von Steuben’s training the Battle of Monmouth proved to be a test of their ability to employ European
battlefield tactics. The Battle of Monmouth was an
American Revolutionary War battle fought on June 28, 1778, in Monmouth County,
New Jersey. The Continental Army under General George Washington attacked the
rear of the British Army column commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Henry
Clinton as they left Monmouth Court House.
Summary of the morning
Unsteady handling of lead
Continental elements by Major General Charles Lee had allowed British rearguard
commander Lieutenant General Charles Cornwallis to seize the initiative, but
Washington's timely arrival on the battlefield rallied the Americans along a
hilltop hedgerow.
Source #1 Monmouth Morning
Summary of the afternoon
Sensing the opportunity to smash
the Continentals, Cornwallis pressed his attack and captured the hedgerow in
stifling heat. Washington consolidated his troops in a new line on heights
behind marshy ground, used his artillery to fix the British in their positions,
and then brought up a four-gun battery under Major General Nathanael Greene on
nearby Combs Hill to enfilade the British line, requiring Cornwallis to
withdraw.
Source #2 Monmouth Afternoon
Washington, advancing with the main force along the
Monmouth road and not having been informed of the retreat of Lee's men,
encountered Lee's fleeing troops and finally Lee himself, with the British in
hot pursuit. After a heated exchange with Lee, Washington relieved him of
command and sent him to the rear. He then galloped to rally Lee's troops. His
white horse died from heat exhaustion, and so he picked up a chestnut mare. He
stopped the retreating soldiers, commanding them, "Stand fast, my boys, and
receive your enemy. The Southern troops are advancing to support you." The
men rallied and delayed the British pursuit until the main force could take up
positions further to the west.
Source #3 Washington Rallying the Troops at
Monmouth; in 1857, Emanuel Leutze painted this for the Monmouth
County Historical Association.
The remnants of Lee's forces then withdrew to the main
American force, where the Continental Army troops were positioned behind the
West Ravine on the Monmouth Courthouse - Freehold Meeting House Road; Lee, in
spite of the chastisement he had been dealt by Washington, remained at the
bridge until he had ushered the last of the soldiers across the Ravine.
Washington drew up his army with Greene's division on the right, Major General
Stirling’s division on the left, and most of Lee's former force, now under
Lafayette, in reserve. In front of his lines, Wayne commanded various elements
of Lee's force. Artillery was placed on both wings, with the right wing in
position to enfilade the advancing British.
The British came on and attacked Stirling's left wing
with their light infantry and the 42nd (Black Watch) Regiment in the van. They
were met by a storm of fire from Stirling’s Continentals. The battle raged back
and forth for an hour until three American regiments were sent though woods to
enfilade the attacking British right flank. The attack was successful and sent
the British back to reform.
Foiled on the left, Cornwallis personally led a heavy
attack against Greene's right wing, with a force comprising British and Hessian
grenadiers, light infantry, the Coldstream Guards and another Guards battalion,
and the 37th and 44th Regiments. The attack was met by enfilading fire from Thomas-Antoine
de Mauduit du Plessis’s four 6-pound cannons on Combs Hill, as well as accurate
volleys from Greene's Continental regiments. The British persisted up the
ravine slope but within minutes five high-ranking officers and many men were
down from heavy fire. The attackers recoiled down the slope.
During Cornwallis' abortive attack on Greene, another
British force made up of grenadiers, light infantry and light dragoons hit
Wayne's forward force, who were protected behind a long hedge. Three times the
British were driven back by Wayne's grapeshot and bullets: but an overwhelming
fourth attack overlapped Wayne's position and forced his units to fall back to
the main American line.
The British made no further attempts on the main American
line, although cannonading from both sides continued until 6 p.m. At this point,
the British fell back to a strong position east of the Ravine. Washington
wanted to take the offensive to the British and attack both flanks, but
darkness brought an end to the battle.
The British rested and then resumed their march to the
northeast during the night. Washington wanted to press the battle the next day
but in the morning found that the British had withdrawn during the night,
continuing their march without incident to Sandy Hook and arriving there on
June 30. Clinton's rearguard successfully covered the withdrawal. The British
force was then transported by the Royal Navy across Lower New York Bay to Manhattan.
The British official casualty return reported 65 killed,
59 dead of "fatigue", 170 wounded and 64 missing. The American
official return stated 69 killed, 161 wounded and 132 missing (37 of whom were
found to have died of heat-stroke). Other estimates increase the losses to
1,134 British and 500 American casualties.
The battle effectively ended in a draw, as the Americans
held the field, but the British were able to get the army and supplies safely
to New York.
Source #4 Christopher Geist, “Of Rocks, Trees, Rifles, and Militia: Thoughts on Eighteenth-Century Military Tactics.”
Why did Revolutionary
Era armies face one another at less than a hundred yards in tight formations,
three ranks deep, firing volley after volley? As they shot, they moved closer
together, often closing the fight with a bayonet charge as one force drove the
other from the field. Clumped, the soldiers seemingly offered their foes a
classic “sitting duck” target. But this was true of both sides. Why then did
eighteenth-century armies adopt such tactics?
American officers with prior military experience had learned the
art of warfare under British commanders in the French and Indian War and other
North American actions. Certainly, this was true of George Washington and many
of his staff. . . .
Why then did
eighteenth-century armies adopt “sitting duck” tactics?
The answer is in the arms the armies used. The smoothbore
military musket—the English version came to be known as the Brown Bess—is often
maligned for inaccuracy, though the weapon was true enough at short range, say
less than eighty yards. Yet accuracy was not at all the issue. Rate of fire,
with companies firing in volley, gave muskets their military advantage. A
well-drilled company could load and fire in unison at least four times a
minute, and some seasoned units probably did better. No soldier aimed his
weapon at any single adversary. He “presented” his weapon straight ahead, or
obliquely to the right or left, at the command of his officers, and fired in
unison with his company as rapidly as possible.
As a modern historian has written,
“Speed was everything. Speed for the defending force to pour as
many bullets into the attacking force as possible; speed for the attacking
force to close with its adversary before it had been too severely decimated to
have sufficient strength to carry the position. . . .”
Linear positioning and rapid volleys explain the significance of
the contributions to the American cause of Baron Friedrich von Steuben. Joining
Washington’s regulars in their winter encampment at Valley Forge in February
1778, the German baron somewhat simplified the British manual of arms and used
the new manual to drill the Continental force relentlessly and effectively in
rapid loading and firing of the musket. He improved their battlefield
maneuverability, too. Historian Douglas Southall Freeman called von Steuben the
“first teacher” of the American army.
Rapidity of fire—sending constant, coordinated volleys in the
direction of the enemy—was infinitely more important than the accuracy of any
individual’s musket. Such firepower was hard to achieve unless the men were
arrayed in open terrain and organized by company. So much for rocks and trees.
Source #5 Matrix
What about those rifles? These formidable firearms had been in
use for about a hundred years before the Revolution, and they were plentiful in
the southern and middle colonies, though relatively rare in New England. True
enough, they were more accurate and effective at greater distances, several
hundred yards, than were military muskets. But accuracy came at a price: rifles
took too long to load. A minute or more was needed to tightly “patch” the ball
and carefully ram it down the barrel to engage the rifled grooves that spun the
ball and gave it true trajectory.
Moreover, unlike the riflemen, musketmen did not carry the
powder horns used in the time-consuming measurement of powder for each charge.
A musket’s charge, along with the ball, was measured and encased in a paper
cartridge. The wrapper served as the ball’s wadding when it was quickly, though
loosely, thrown down the barrel and pushed home with the rammer. The
comparative sluggishness of reloading a rifle rendered it unsatisfactory for
linear military tactics. Interpreter Dale Smoot says during his Magazine
presentations, “Rifles are fine weapons for shooting at things that don’t shoot
back—like deer.”
There was another problem with rifles and, indeed, all civilian
long arms of the period. They were not fashioned to accommodate bayonets, an
essential weapon of eighteenth-century infantry. Regular forces moved into
lines of battle with bayonets fixed. Military bayonets were offset from the
muzzle to permit loading and firing with the bayonets in place, always ready
for a charge to force the enemy from the field. Civilian weapons might be
equipped with plug bayonets, essentially knives with wooden plugs to be
inserted into the barrel of the firearm, rendering it incapable of firing.
Source #6 Pennsylvania Rifle – British Infantry Musket
Follow-up/Assessment
Questions:
·
Did the Battle
of Monmouth demonstrate that the Continentals could stand in European battle
formation and oppose the British face-to-face? (Various: the Revolution was fought in a variety of environments and
conditions. Massed forces,
British and patriot, in linear formations fought the battles of Long Island,
Brandywine, Monmouth, Hobkirk’s Hill, White Plains, Germantown, Camden, and
Cowpens, among others. Sometimes, as these engagements evolved, one side or the
other retreated in disarray, and some soldiers sought protection behind fences
or trees or other defensive barriers. But the battle plans developed by the
generals relied on linear tactics in the European fashion that dominated
eighteenth-century warfare. Most battles intentionally initiated by either side
in the Revolution were planned and contested with traditional European linear
tactics. Little would change until the invention of the rifled musket and the
Minnie ball shortly before the American Civil War).
·
Had the
Continentals met the British in open field and forced them
to retreat? (The British disengaged and
did not face Washington the next day).
·
Monmouth was the last major battle in the northern
theater and the largest one-day battle of the war when measured in terms of
participants. How significant is the Battle for the war effort? For the field
leadership of Washington? (It was a test
of von Steuben’s drilling and tactics. Washington relieved Lee of command and
took charge on the battlefield.).
·
What do you think should happen to Lee? (Lee was later court-martialed).
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Finally, the legend of “Molly Pitcher” is usually
associated with this battle. It is believed that she was Mary Ludwig Hays.
According to one story, she was the wife of an American artilleryman who lived
near the battlefield, bringing water for swabbing the cannons and for the
thirsty crews, and took her husband's place after he fell, and helped him with
his wounds. The artillery men gave her the nickname "Molly Pitcher"
when she was bringing them water from a nearby spring. The story is based on a
true incident but has become embellished over the years.
