In February, American troops detained Ghalib Ali Hamid, the intelligence and internal affairs chief of the Oil Protection Force at the refinery, on suspicion of skimming fuel profits and having ties to insurgents. Graphic source: The N.Y. Times
The N.Y. Times reports that the Baiji refinery "may be the most important industrial site in the Sunni Arab-dominated regions of Iraq." On a peak production day 500 tanker trucks leave the refinery filled with fuel with a street value of $10 million.
Unfortunately, many Iraqis divert at least one-third, and possibly much more, of the fuel from Iraq’s Baiji refinery to the black market. Tankers are hijacked, drivers are bribed, papers are forged and meters are manipulated. And to top it off, at least some of the money reaches insurgents who are still killing more than 100 Iraqis a week.
The American military claims that greed, far more than jihadist ideology, is the critical motivator for a majority of Sunni insurgents.
To combat the financial motivation, at least 91,000 Iraqis, many of them former enemies of the American forces, receive a regular, American-paid salary for serving in neighborhood militias.
In the Salahuddin area of the refinery for example, there were eight pre-war local gas stations, a figure that has ballooned to fifty. The reason is not economic growth but graft.
The Times reports that:
Gas stations are often built just to gain the rights to fuel shipments, at subsidized government rates, that can be resold onto the black market at higher prices. New stations cost more than $100,000 to build, but black market profits from six or seven trucks can often cover that cost, and everything after that is profit, said officials who have studied the scheme.
During last year, the Pentagon estimated that as much as 70 percent of the Baiji refinery’s production, or $2 billion in fuels like gasoline, kerosene and diesel, disappeared annually into the black market.
The insurgents have their agents at all levels, and some are the watchdogs who are supposed to oversee the operation. In February, American troops detained Ghalib Ali Hamid, the intelligence and internal affairs chief of the Oil Protection Force at the refinery, on suspicion of skimming fuel profits and having ties to insurgents.
Although Al Qaeda receives the bulk of Western attention, many in the U.S. military question the numbers and loyalty of average Iraqis for the group. In the opinion of U.S. middle-level troops, jihadist ideology is secondary to the financial incentive of average Iraqis who need to earn a living.
The other major guerrilla groups in the country are Jaish-e-Muhammad, or the Army of Muhammad, which includes ex-Baathists and former military officers, who continue to battle American forces. Some American officers consider the Islamic State of Iraq, to be a front group for Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.
But other groups such as the 1920s Revolutionary Brigades and Jaish al-Islami, or the Islamic Army, have agreed to support American-financed Sunni militia forces.
The question is whether bribing former insurgents to stop attacking American forces is an effective counter-terrorism force, or whether developing a more secure economic infrastructure would solve the problem. American officers are concerned that the failure to incorporate these Sunni militiamen into the government of Iraq or find them other jobs could portend trouble.
As we might say, you have to do what you need to in order to survive.
Graphic source: The New York Times
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