A New Type of War: The Story of the FAA and NORAD Response to the September 11, 2001 Attacks
I posted some excerpts here.
4. American 11
At 8:24:38, American 11 began a turn to the south and the following transmission came from American 11:
082444 AA11 keying 2 transmissions.mp3
This Boston Sector controller heard something unintelligible over the radio, and did not hear the specific words “[w]e have some planes” at the time. The next transmission came seconds later:
082457 Nobody move.mp3
The controller has told the media and Commission staff during interviews, when he heard this second transmission, he “felt from those voices the terror” and immediately knew something was very wrong. He knew it was a hijack.”[xiv]
At 8:34, as FAA headquarters received its initial notification that American 11 had been hijacked, the Boston sector controller received a third transmission from American 11.
083359 Nobody move please going back to airport.mp3
American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46:40. [Word of the crash of an airplane began to work its way quickly through the FAA's New York Center.]
084739 AA11 Discussion To First Impact Line 5114.mp3
083815 AA11 Powell Cooper Deskins.mp3
The United States’ military defense of its homeland on 9/11 began with this call. Indeed, this was the first notification received by the military – at any level – that American [11] had been hijacked. NEADS promptly ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base, Massachusetts, about 153 miles away from New York City.[xxi]
083922 NEADS weapons and MCC battle stations.mp3
084000 AA11 Panta 45 battle stations cape tape.mp3
At NEADS, the reported hijack was relayed immediately to Battle Commander Colonel Robert Marr, who was stationed in the Battle Cab in preparation for a scheduled NORAD exercise. Col. Marr asked the same question – confirming that the hijacking was “real-world” – then ordered fighter pilots at Otis Air Force Base in Massachusetts to battle-stations.[xxii]
He then phoned Maj. General Larry Arnold, commanding General of the First Air Force and CONR. Col. Marr advised him of the situation, and sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters in response to the reported hijacking. General Arnold instructed Col. Marr “to go ahead and scramble the airplanes and we’d get permission later. And the reason for that is that the procedure … if you follow the book, is they [law enforcement officials] go to the duty officer of the national military center, who in turn makes an inquiry to NORAD for the availability of fighters, who then gets permission from someone representing the Secretary of Defense. Once that is approved then we scramble an aircraft. We didn’t wait for that.”[xxiii] General Arnold then picked up the phone and talked to the operations deputy up at NORAD and said, “Yeah, we’ll work with the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Go ahead and scramble the aircraft.”[xxiv]
The scramble order was passed from the Battle Commander (BC) to the Mission Crew Commander (MCC), who passed the order to the Weapons Director (WD).[xxv] Almost immediately, however, a problem arose. The Weapons Director asked: “MCC. I don’t know where I’m scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination.”[xxvi] Because the hijackers had turned off the plane’s transponder, the plane appeared only as a primary track on radar.
083800 AA11 NEADS ID techs react to Powell.mp3
F-15 fighters were ordered scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base and vectored toward military airspace off the coast of Long Island.[xxvii]
084555 NEADS Powell Otis scramble.mp3
As the order to scramble Otis fighters came at 8:46, American 11 was hitting the World Trade Center and United 175 was being hijacked in New York Center’s airspace. The military did not hear anything about United 175 until it crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center.
Working over the phone with the FAA Center in Boston, at least one NEADS tracker found a primary track roughly eight miles east-northeast of Manhattan, but the track faded before he could confirm it with Boston Center.[xxviii] Unbeknownst to the military, the Otis fighters were scrambled [at] nearly the exact time that American 11 crashed into the North Tower. Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. [xxix]
The Mission Crew Commander explained to the Battle Cab the plan:
084629 NEADS MCC summary for BC 25 miles Z point.mp3
Shortly after 8:50, while NEADS personnel struggled to locate American 11, word reached the floor that a plane had hit the World Trade Center.[xxx]
4.3 Commission Findings and Assessment
The interplay at the operational levels of the FAA and NORAD regarding American 11 is notable in several respects. First, and most important, Boston Center and NEADS took immediate actions to facilitate a quicker response than a strict following of the official protocols would have allowed for. Boston Center elected to request assistance directly from the Northeast Air Defense Sector. When the request reached NEADS, the Battle Commander and the CONR Commander, rather than seeking authorization to scramble aircraft through the chain of command and, ultimately, the Secretary of Defense, chose to authorize the action on their own and, as General Arnold (CONR Commander) put it, “seek the authorities later.” It is difficult to fault either decision. Given the emergent nature of the situation, the reports of “trouble in the cockpit,” and the fact that there was no easily identified transponder signal emitted from the aircraft, the necessity to shortcut the hijack protocols seems apparent. It is clear, moreover, that the protocols themselves were ill-suited to the American 11 event; the multi-layered notification and approval process assumed a “classic” hijack scenario in which there is ample time for notice to occur, there is no difficulty in locating the aircraft, the hijackers intend to land the aircraft somewhere, and the military’s role is limited to identification and escort of the aircraft. Indeed, the hijack protocols were not reasserted on 9/11 until the attacks were completed.
However, bypassing the established protocols for air emergencies, though justified in the case of American 11, may have had an unintended ill effect as the day wore on; leadership at the national levels at the FAA and DoD [was] not involved – or [was] involved only after the fact – in the critical decision making and the evolving situational awareness regarding American 11. As the Commission has presented in its June 2004 public hearing and in the official “9/11 Commission Report,” they [national leaders] would remain largely irrelevant to the critical decision making and unaware of the evolving situation “on the ground” until the attacks were completed.
The critical information NEADS received would continue to come from Boston Center, which relayed information as it was overheard on FAA teleconferences. Indeed, at one point that morning the Mission Crew Commander, in the absence of regular communication from anyone else at FAA, encouraged the Military position at Boston Center to continue to provide information: “if you get anything, if you – any of your controllers see anything that looks kind of squirrelly, just give us a yell. We’ll get those fighters in that location.”[xxxii] The NEADS ID Technicians would complain repeatedly that morning: “Washington has no clue what the hell is going on… Washington has no clue.”[xxxiii]
0944 Washington has no clue.mp3
The first part of the tape seems altered or it as severely distorted in contrast with the other audio when a voice is heard to say: "Washington has no clue."
The Boston Military FAA representative, when interviewed, expressed astonishment that he had been the principal source of information for the NEADS personnel on the morning of 9/11; he stated his belief that he must have been one of several FAA sources constantly updating NEADS that morning.[xxxiv] No open line was established between NEADS and CONR and either FAA headquarters or the Command Center at Herndon until the attacks were virtually over.
It is clear that, as the order to scramble came at 8:46, just as American 11 was hitting the World Trade Center, the military had insufficient notice of the hijacking to position its assets to respond. This reality would also be repeated throughout the morning. Indeed, the eight minutes’ notice that NEADS had of American 11 would prove to be the most notice the sector would receive that morning of any of the hijackings, and the sector’s inability to locate the primary radar track until the last few readings would also recur.
5. UNITED 175
084131 AA11 UA175 ZNY report of suspicious transmission Boston.mp3
The controller turned United 175 away from the aircraft (American 11) as a safety precaution. At this point, United 175 had entered New York Center’s airspace and unfortunately, the controller responsible for United 175 was the same controller assigned the job of tracking the hijacked American 11. At 8:47, nearly simultaneously with the impact of American 11 into the World Trade Center, United 175′s assigned transponder code changed from 1470 to 3020, and then again to 3321.[vii] These changes were not noticed, however, for several minutes, as the controller was focused on trying to determine the location of American 11, which had disappeared as a primary radar track. Indeed, New York Center was completely focused on the situation with American 11, as indicated in the following report given by New York Center on a teleconference that had been established between their center, Boston Center and the Command Center. (Note that this report was made at approximately 8:48, just minutes after the impact of American 11 into the North Tower, though that was not known by the individual at the time).
The controllers observed the plane in a rapid descent; the radar data terminated over lower Manhattan.[xvii] At 9:03:02, United 175 crashed into World Trade Center’s South Tower.[xviii]
090608 AA11 Confirmed on tape we have planes line 5114.mp3
At exactly the same time that the “we have planes” was confirmed, both Boston Center and New York Center closed down their airspace.[xxi] The result of this action was that aircraft were not permitted to depart from, arrive at, or travel through those Centers’ airspace until further notice.[xxii]
090230 NEADS notified of UA175.mp3
The ID Technicians were on the phone with Boston Center seeking further information on United 175 when they found out that the plane may have crashed.[xxv] Before retrieving the flight’s vital statistics for NEADS, Boston Center confirmed the second crash at the Trade Center.[xxvi] There had been no prior notification that the plane was hijacked, or, for that matter, missing.[xxvii] The fighters from Otis Air Force Base were south of Long Island at the time.[xxviii]
The Mission Crew Commander’s reaction to the second explosion at the World Trade Center was to reject the idea of holding the fighters in military air space away from Manhattan.
090727 Panta over Manhattan some kind of play DRM 1 CH 2.mp3
The FAA cleared the air space. Radar data show that at 9:13, when the Otis fighters were about 115 miles away from the city, the fighters exited their holding pattern and set a course direct for Manhattan. They arrived at 9:25 and established a combat air patrol (CAP) over the city.[xxix]
Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military air space and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling. As NEADS personnel looked for refueling tankers in the vicinity of New York, the Mission Crew Commander considered scrambling the Langley fighters to New York to provide back-up for the Otis fighters until the NEADS Battle Cab ordered “[b]attle stations only at Langley.”[xxx]
090830 Langley battle stations not scramble D1 CH 5.mp3
The alert fighters at Langley Air Force Base were ordered to battle stations at 9:09.
090925 Langley BS Norfolk tower.mp3
Col. Marr, the battle commander at NEADS, and General Arnold, the CONR Commander, both recall that the planes were held on battle stations, as opposed to scrambling, because they might be called upon to relieve the Otis fighters over New York City if a refueling tanker was not located, and also because of the general uncertainty of the situation in the sky.[xxxi] According to retired Col. William Scott at the Commission’s May 23, 2003 hearing, “At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations, just based on the general situation and the breaking news, and the general developing feeling about what’s going on.”[xxxii] NORAD had no indication that any other plane had been hijacked.
5.3 Commission Findings and Assessment
The most noteworthy aspect of the time sequence recounted above is a time that is not mentioned: 8:43. In the days immediately following 9/11, both NORAD and FAA identified 8:43 as the time at which NORAD was notified of the hijacking of United 175; this time was picked up by The Washington Post and other prominent media outlets, and widely disseminated in the public record. The tapes and transcripts, corroborated by witness interviews, show, however, that 8:43 could not have been the time of notification. The FAA controller did not notice the change in transponder signal from United 175 until 8:51; there is no way that FAA could have notified NORAD of the hijacking at 8:43 when it did not even realize there was a problem with the flight until eight minutes later.
The Commission has been unable to identify the source of the inaccurate 8:43 hijack notification time for United 175. Both FAA and NORAD, however, eventually dropped that notification time from their official version of events; neither can account for its original inclusion.[xxxiii]
The inclusion of an 8:43 notification time in the early press releases from FAA and NORAD muddied the public record by raising questions about whether the Otis fighters were vectored properly; a flight path into military air space is difficult to justify when there is a reported second hijacking and one aircraft has already crashed into the World Trade Center. The actual flight path taken by the fighters is defensible given the fact that the second hijacking was reported as it was concluding; the Mission Crew Commander wanted the fighters eventually over New York City, but in the absence of a second emergent event was willing to hold the fighters over military airspace until the FAA could clear a path.
6. AMERICAN 77
The controller tracking American 77 told the Commission he first noticed the aircraft turning to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear. The controller looked for primary radar returns. He searched along its projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the airline. Again there was nothing. At this point, the Indianapolis controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He did not know that other aircraft had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical and/or mechanical failure, and was gone.
6.3 Military Notification and Response
By no later than 9:21, FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, some FAA field facilities and American Airlines had started to search for American 77 and feared it had been hijacked. Four minutes later, at 9:25, Command Center reported to FAA Headquarters all the information Command Center had learned regarding American 77.[xxv] The military was completely unaware the search for American 77 had begun. In fact, the military would hear once again about American 11, a plane that had already crashed, before they received any notification that American 77 was lost.
6.4 Commission Findings and Assessment
The sequence outlined above is again noteworthy for its omission of notification times that have been widely circulated. In the official NORAD version of the events of 9/11, as presented to the Commission in May 2003, at 9:16, NORAD was notified that United 93 was a possible hijack and that notification was followed, at 9:24, by the notification that American 77 was a hijacked aircraft. According to retired Col. William Scott at the Commission’s May 23, 2003 hearing, the FAA notified NORAD of the hijacking of United 93 at 9:16 (forty-five minutes prior to crash), and of the hijacking of American 77 at 9:24 (14 minutes prior to crash). Retired Col. Scott also indicated that the fighters at Langley Air Force Base were scrambled at 9:25 to meet the threat to Washington posed by American 77.[xxxi]
Retired General Larry Arnold amplified this information in testimony before the Commission, stating: “9:24 was the first time that we had been advised of American 77 as a possible hijacked airplane. Our focus – you have got to remember that there’s a lot of other things going on simultaneously here – was on United 93, which was being pointed out to us very aggressively I might say by the FAA. ¼ We were advised [American 77] was possibly hijacked. And we had launched almost simultaneously with that, we launched the aircraft out of Langley to put them over top of Washington, DC, not in response to American Airlines 77, but really to put them in position in case United 93 were to head that way.”[xxxii]
Based on its review of the tapes, transcripts and other records obtained under subpoena, as corroborated by witness interviews at NEADS, Commission staff can state unequivocally that the timeline and testimony presented at the Commission’s May 23, 2003 hearing were not true. The 9:24 notification time for American 77 (as well as the claimed 9:16 notification for United 93) was inaccurately derived from a handwritten log maintained by the staff working for the Mission Crew Commander (the operational commander on watch). Called the “MCC/T Log,” it was the principal log of events kept at NEADS on 9/11. At 9:24, the log records: “American Airlines #N334AA hijacked.”[xxxiii] This tail number refers not to American 77 but to American 11, the first hijacked aircraft. The subpoenaed tapes confirm that this time corresponds to the receipt of the tail number information on American 11 and to reports that American 11 was still airborne and headed towards Washington DC.[xxxiv]
Nor were the Langley fighters scrambled to meet the threat posed by American 77. The first notification to the military (NEADS) that American 77 is missing (there is no mention of it being hijacked at this point) comes at 9:34, ten minutes after the scramble has already been ordered at Langley Air Force Base.
The Langley fighters were initially scrambled not because of United 93, which had not been hijacked, nor because of American 77, which had not been reported to NEADS, but because of the mistaken report that American 11 had in fact not hit the World Trade Center, but was heading south towards Washington, DC. The fighters were ordered scrambled initially toward New York, and then vectored toward Baltimore, in an effort to intercept that mistakenly reported aircraft. The best evidence for both this false report and the resulting scramble is the subpoenaed NEADS tape, quoted above, which records the Mission Crew Commander’s immediate reaction to the report: “Okay. American Airlines is still airborne, 11, the first guy. He’s headed towards Washington, okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now, and I’m going to – I’m going to take the fighters from Otis and try to chase this guy down if I can find him.”[xxxv] Seconds after that reaction, the Mission Crew Commander ordered the scramble of the Langley fighters.
This report of American 11 heading south – the cause of the Langley scramble – is reflected not just in taped conversations at NEADS, but in taped conversations at FAA centers, on chat logs compiled at NEADS, CONR, and NORAD, and in records extending to the highest levels of the federal government. [xxxvi] The false report was also readily acknowledged in interviews of operational personnel. Nonetheless, it is not recounted in a single public timeline issued by FAA or DOD, nor in a single public statement by government officials. Instead, the scramble at Langley is attributed to the reported hijacking of American 77, United 93, or some combination of the two.
When interviewed, Col. Marr stated that he had discounted the report that American 11 was still airborne, and insisted that the Langley scramble was in response to “everything else that was going on” that morning, and referred specifically to United 93. When informed that United 93 had not been hijacked by the time of the Langley scramble, and that American 77 was not reported missing to the NEADS air defenders until after the Langley scramble had occurred, Col. Marr was unable to point to any other complicating factors that might have led to the Langley scramble.[xxxvii]
Col. Marr’s recollection is belied by the tapes and transcripts from the morning of 9/11, the testimony of his subordinates, and the contemporaneous records from the day. The Mission Crew Commander and the ID Technicians who were on duty that morning had no doubt that the sequence revealed on the tapes, in which the Mission Crew Commander orders Langley scrambled in immediate response to the news that American 11 is still airborne, was in fact what occurred.[xxxviii]
The Commission has been unable to identify the source of the mistaken information regarding American 11. The Boston Center Military Desk person who provided the information to NEADS had been listening in on an FAA teleconference out of Washington, DC. A Senior FAA official who was working at Headquarters that morning recalls having passed the information to others, but does not know its source.[xxxix]
What is clear is that the introduction of a third hijacking into the FAA system proved to be extremely confusing, raising doubts as to the identities of the two planes that had crashed into the World Trade Center and leading, ultimately, to the false report that one of the original hijacked aircraft was still airborne, heading for Washington.
Overall, this sequence of events regarding American 77 again belies NORAD’s official timeline and the testimony given at the Commission’s May 23, 2003 hearing. Notification of American 77 as a missing aircraft came at 9:34, after the Langley fighters had already taken off. Remarkably, the notification, when it occurred, came completely fortuitously, not as the result of existing notification protocols between FAA and NORAD. The ID Technician at NEADS called Washington Center at the prompting of the Boston FAA Military desk, in order to find further information about American 11. If NEADS had not placed that call themselves, the NEADS air defenders would have received no notification whatsoever that American 77 was missing prior to its crash. Given the facts that there had already been two suicide hijackings and that the FAA – both at the Command Center and at several regional centers – had been searching for American 77 for over thirty minutes, the failure of FAA proactively to notify NORAD of the missing aircraft seems egregious, even in hindsight.
Even when FAA controllers at Dulles Tower did pick up the primary radar track of an unknown aircraft southwest of Washington, no one at FAA thought ask for military assistance. Once again, the NEADS air defenders received word of the unknown target from Boston Center’s Military position, which happened to overhear the discussion of the sighting on a teleconference originating from Washington.
8. UNITED 93
United 93 again radioed Cleveland Center at 9:25, checking in at 35,000 feet. The controller replied, “United ninety-three, Cleveland, roger.”[v] The controller then engaged in conversation with several aircraft about the evolving situation in New York City and the prospects for flights to be allowed to land in Philadelphia; while the controller was extremely discreet, it was clear what he was talking about. The time was 9:26.
092556 Midex 150 Philiadelphia.mp3
The controller, who was moving planes away from each other as the traffic built in his sector from the ground stop in New York and Boston, warned several planes, including United 93: “United 93 that traffic for you is one o’clock twelve miles eastbound three seven zero.” The aircraft acknowledged: “Negative contact we’re looking United Ninety-three.”[vi] Then, at 9:28, the controller and the pilots of several other flights heard “a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin …”[vii] The controller responded: “Somebody call Cleveland?”[viii] This was followed, at 9:29, by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming and someone yelling “Get out of here, get out of here,” again from an unknown source.[ix] The Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions, and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet.
One of the strangest is a tape of unintelligible screaming.
0928 UA93 last normal and first trouble.mp3
87. 0928 UA93 last normal and first trouble
Cleveland Center Controller: United 93, that traffic for you is one o’clock, twelve miles eastbound, three seven zero.
UA93: Negative contact, we’re looking, United ninety three.
UA93: Hey (indistinct yelling).
Cleveland Center Controller: Somebody call Cleveland?
AA1060: Roger American, ah, 1066, with you. We’re at three seven oh, we’re, ah, slowing, ah, due to the delays if possible going eastbound.
Cleveland Center Controller: That’s American 1066?
UA93: (Indistinct yelling) mayday (indistinct yelling).
Cleveland Center Controller: You got United 93?
Cleveland Center Controller 2: United 93, south of Chardon, descended.
Cleveland Center Controller: What’s that?
Cleveland Center Controller 2: I just sayin’ it looks like he descended there.
Cleveland Center Controller: I don’t think so. United 93, verify three five zero.
Cleveland Center Controller 2. United 93, Cleveland
Cleveland Center: Go ahead (indistinct).
Cleveland Center Controller 2: Do you have United 93 south of Chardon?
Cleveland Center: We hear some funny noises we’re trying to get him. Do you have him?
Cleveland Center Controller 2: No.
Cleveland Center: Thank You. United 93, Cleveland.
Cleveland Center Controller: United 1523 did you hear your company, ah, did you hear, ah, some interference on the frequency, ah, couple a minutes ago, screaming?
United1523: Yes I did seven ninety seven and, ah, we couldn’t tell what it was either.
Cleveland Center Controller: Ok. United 93, Cleveland, if you hear the center, ident.
AA1060: American 1060. Ditto on the other transmissions.
Cleveland Center Controller: American 1060, you heard that also?
AA1060: Yes sir, twice.
At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency: “keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board.”[xi]
0932 UA93 bomb on board.mp3
Then, at 9:39, another radio transmission came over the frequency from United 93:
0939 UA93 bomb on board and controller followup.mp3
90. 0939 UA93 Bomb on Board and Controller Follow-up
Ziad Jarrah: This is the Captain. I would like you all to remain seated. We have a bomb on board and are going back to the airport and have our demands, so please remain quiet.
Cleveland Center: Ok, that’s United 93 calling? United 93 understand you have a bomb on board, go ahead.
ExecJet 956: Command Center, ExecJet 956, that was the transmission.
Cleveland Center: ExecJet 956, did you understand that transmission?
ExecJet 956: Affirmative, he said there was a bomb on board.
Cleveland Center: That’s what you got out of it also?
ExecJet 956: Affirmative.
Cleveland Center: Roger, United 93, go ahead.
093601 ZOB call re want to scramble military here.mp3
Indeed, from 9:34 to 10:08, a Command Center facility manager provided several updates to the Deputy Administrator and other executives at FAA headquarters as United 93 approached the Washington, DC area. Specifically, at 9:41, Command Center notified headquarters that United 93 had reversed course from its intended flight path and was descending:
0941 UA93 CC to HQ FAA over Akron.mp3
At 9:42, Command Center learned through a television news report that a plane had struck the Pentagon.[xvii] FAA headquarters also knew the Pentagon had been attacked by an aircraft.[xviii] Shortly after Command Center heard about the crash at the Pentagon, Command Center’s National Operations Manager, Ben Sliney, ordered all FAA facilities to instruct all airborne aircraft to land at the nearest airport.[xix] At the time the order was given, there were approximately 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircraft in the skies over the United States. All aircraft landed without incident. This was an unprecedented order. The air traffic control system handled it with great skill.
0949 Pulling Jeff away.mp3
[The timing of this conversation is consistent with the FAA Administrator Jane Garvey and her staff's having joined the Air Threat Conference Call run by Richard Clarke from the White House Situation Room. There is no evidence that the report passed to FAA Headquarters from the Command Center reached the military in a timely fashion.]
At 9:53, FAA headquarters informed Command Center that the Deputy Director for Air Traffic Services was talking to Deputy Administrator Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft.[xx] Then, at 9:56, Command Center informed headquarters they lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area.[xxi] Within seconds, Command Center located United 93 and informed headquarters:
0958 UA93 20 miles Johnstown.mp3
At 10:00, Command Center advised headquarters that “United ninety three was spotted by a VFR at eight thousand feet, eleven, eleven miles south of Indianhead, just north of Cumberland, Maryland.[xxii] At 10:01, just two minutes before United 93 crashed, Command Center provided FAA headquarters with the following update:
1000 UA93 Rocking wings.mp3
At 10:08, five minutes after United 93 crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, Command Center forwarded this update to headquarters:
100744 UA93 Report of black smoke AA77 Q re police report.mp3
At 10:17, Command Center advised headquarters of its belief that United 93 had “crashed fifteen miles south of Johnstown, Pennsylvania”.[xxiii]
No one from FAA headquarters requested military assistance regarding United 93. In fact, the executive level managers at FAA headquarters did not forward the information they received from Command Center regarding United 93 to the military.
8.2 Military Notification and Response
NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center, at 10:07. This call was the first notification the military – at any level – received about United 93. Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft’s last know latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground.
100701 UA93 ZOB to NEADS bomb on board.mp3
When the information that United 93 had turned off its transponder and had a potential bomb on board reached the mission crew commander, he was dealing with the arrival of the Langley fighters over Washington and what their orders were with respect to potential targets. While NEADS searched for the radar track on United 93, the Mission Crew Commander and his Weapons Director engaged in the following conversation shortly after 10:10 concerning the rules of engagement:
100901 UA93 negative clearance to shoot.mp3
Nasypany: One five two seven, mode 3, do we have a track number? 1527, ode 3 we got a track number?
Nasypany: Ok, we got a mode 3 on this, ah, United 93.
Nasypany: How close are you?
[Background] Unknown: (Indistinct).
[Background] Sr. ID Tech: (Indistinct) three nine five one north.
Nasypany: Three nine five one north.
[Background] Sr. ID Tech: Zero seven eight four six west.
Nasypany: Zero seven eight four six west.
[Background] Sr. ID Tech: This is the guy with the bomb on board.
Nasypany: Got it.
[Background] Unknown: I just got off the phone with the Colonel and he has one E3 on, that’s on its way out here (indistinct).
Nasypany: Toledo was—look for him. Hey, I need a track number.
Nasypany: Ok. Hey, Brian, ok, 2 Syracuse birds will be airborne in less than 20 minutes, any weapons?
[Background] Unknown: (Indistinct) near Pittsburg, mode 3, one five two seven.
Nasypany: We don’t know. Just press with that.
[Background] Unknown: We have any committed on the one aircraft with a bomb on it?
Nasypany: We’re gettin to it. We don’t know where it is, we’re gettin’ track on it.
Unknown: Pass that to weapons.
Nasypany: Yeah. Ok. Got it.
[Background] Unknown: United nine three, mode 3, one five two seven.
Nasypany: Negative, negative clearance to shoot.
Nasypany: Jaime?
[Background] Unknown: One five two seven Brian.
Nasypany: God dammit. Foxy?
Fox: I’m not really worried about code words (indistinct).
Nasypany: Fuck the code words. That’s perishable information. Negative clearance to fire. ID type, tail. Hey, let your guys know also.
As the news of a bomb on board United 93 spread throughout the floor, the NEADS air defenders searched for the primary radar target and the Mission Crew Commander tried to locate assets to scramble toward the plane. At approximately 10:11, the commander got on the phone with an Air National Guard Unit in Syracuse:
101145 NEADS discussion with Syracuse Cdr.mp3
NEADS Identification Technicians called Washington Center to provide a “heads up” to them about United 93, but Washington Center provided NEADS with startling new information on the flight:
101418 ZDC to NEADS UA93 is down.mp3
The time was 10:15 and the call was NEADS’ first notice that United 93 had crashed.[xxiv] The actual time of the crash was 10:03:11.
By 10:15, the NEADS air defenders knew that two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center, a third had crashed into the Pentagon, Delta 1989 had landed safely in Cleveland and was not a hijack, and United 93 had crashed in Pennsylvania.
The minutes after 10:15 were spent on the floor at NEADS attempting to mobilize other fighters from the eastern seaboard, and anticipating the arrival of Air Force Once in the Washington area. The Mission Crew Commander was notified at 10:25 that “Air Force One is airborne out of Florida heading to Washington. We’ve got those four F-15s coming out of Langley. They’re done rolling. Two of them will be diverted to escort at the appropriate time.” [xxv]
Then, at 10:32, the MCC Technician read information that had just come across the Chat Log from CONR in Florida:
103200 chat log shoot-down words.mp3
107. 103200 Chat Log Shootdown words
Floor Leadership: You need to read this. Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down tracks if they are not responding to our, uh, directions.
MCC Position: Ok. I’ll pass that to weapons.
Floor Leadership: Ok.
MCC Position: The Region Com, the Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to our direction. Copy that?
Weapons: Copy that sir.
MCC Position: So if you’re trying to divert somebody and he won’t divert—
Major Fox: D-O is saying no.
MCC Position: No? It came over the chat. Foxy, you got a conflict on that, you got a conflict on that direction?
Major Fox: Right now, no, but—
MCC Position: Ok.
Floor Leadership: Hey—
MCC Position: Ok.
Floor Leadership: You read that from the Vice President, right? The Vice President has cleared—
MCC Position: Vice President has cleared us to intercept tracks—
Floor Leadership: Of interest—
MCC Position: And shoot them down if they do not respond, per CONR CC.
The NEADS air defenders have expressed considerable confusion over the nature and effect of this order in interviews with Commission staff.[xxvi] Indeed, Colonel Marr indicated to staff that he actually believes he withheld the order from the floor for several minutes because he was unsure of its ramifications,[xxvii] while both the Mission Crew Commander and the Weapons Director indicated that they withheld the order from the pilots flying Combat Air Patrol over Washington, DC and New York City because they were unsure how the pilots would or should proceed with such an order.[xxviii] The Weapons Director [struggled with repeated requests from the pilots and controllers for clarification of the rules of engagement, but ultimately responded:]
1051 Currently at peace.mp3
1053 New direction coming down.mp3
1053 Boston track of interest.mp3
110. 1053 Boston track of interest
Panta One: Zulu five five thirty BRA seventeen thousand, flanking two eight zero.
Background: Goin' over Boston.
Controller: Yes.
Major Fox: If you have a track of interest—
Panta One: Panta's dropping a group, BRA, ah, zero six zero (indistinct).
Controller: Hold on, they're talkin' to me right now, just a second.
Controller: Panta, Huntress, stand by one.
Controller: Ok, ok, give me what you were talkin' about.
Background: (Indistinct) I need you to give me (indistinct).
Controller: Tell me what you need to tell me.
Controller: This is for Panta One, correct, they're capping over—
Major Fox: Yes.
Controller: Boston—ok, what.
Major Fox: Any track of interest that's headin' towards a major city you will ID, if you cannot diver them away from a major city, you are to confirm with me first, most likely you will get clearance to shoot.
Controller: And tell me, I have to tell them that in the clear?
Major Fox: You can tell them exactly in those words
Controller: Ok.
Background: (Indistinct).
Controller: Stand by. I gotta pass this right now.
Controller: Panta one, Huntress.
Panta One: Panta One
Controller: Panta one call all, all and any tracks of interest, verify if they were going toward a major city, mission ID, unsuccessful, divert, ask for our clearance to shoot.
1102 Controller asks for kill direction.mp3
111. 1102 Controller asks for kill direction
Controller: MCC, when able, ah, the kill direction, once again, I want it one more time before I tell these guys. I'm just gonna give them a brief. I'm not goin' to tell them to do nothin'. I'm gonna say what, what to expect, though.
[Background] Major Fox: Just, tell ‘em right now we have intercept authority only—
Cobra One: Huntress, Cobra One.
Controller: Stand by.
1103 Cleared to engage.mp3
112. 1103 Cleared to engage
Controller: I told them our mission is to protect major centers and we're goin' to take you and drag you down to Pittsburgh, and do this, because I got a tanker comin' now. But, ah, I just want to give them an ROE because it's gonna' be auto-ops once he's down there. So I want to make sure I got clear concise words to him before he leaves. Granted they only got four turrets of guns
[Background] Unknown: If they don't, ah, if they do not, don't respond to divert to hand signals and divert procedures and are headed toward a major area then you are cleared to engage.
Controller: Wilco.
Controller: Cobra and Apex, this is Huntress.
Cobra One: Huntress.
Huntress: Okay, there is still a bit of traffic airborne, they're not all completely down, I imagine it's all low south of you, if you'll hold two loops before the tanker gets, ah, Oh, shit, I need a check list.
Cobra One: Cobra Onecopies
Controller: OK, I have ah ROE instructions, are you ready to copy?
Cobra One. Stand by, Huntress.
Cobra One: This is, ah, Cobra One, go ahead.
Controller: Ok the, OK the direction ah protectin' the major centers, when you're overhead the major center, be it Pittsburgh in this case, you're, you have intercept authority on any traffic in the area. And if, if the traffic does not respond to, ah, hand signals, divert procedures, anything like that, and they continue to press in a threatening manner towards the major center, you're cleared to engage.
Cobra One: Cobra copies.
The shoot-down [authorization] order was the first official “rules of engagement” (ROE) of the morning to come down through the chain of command at DOD to NEADS. At virtually the same time, the Department of Defense elevated its alert status to DEFCON 3. This alert posture was suited more to a Cold War conflict than to al Qaeda’s attack. Nonetheless, the shift to an elevated alert status signified the reassertion of authority by the national command structure. The air defense of the United States – subsequently called operation “Noble Eagle” – had at last begun.
8.3 Commission Findings and Assessment
The operational facts of the military response to United 93, as reflected in the tapes and transcripts as corroborated by contemporaneous logs and witness interviews, contrast sharply with the official explanations of that response. The military did not receive notice that United 93 was a hijacking at 9:16, as reported to the Commission, in May 2003, by NORAD; that notice came at 10:07.
At 9:16, the MCC/T Log records: “United tail #N612UA/75 S0B/”[xxix] This tail number corresponds not with United 93 but with United 175, which had crashed into the World Trade Center. A corresponding conversation on the subpoenaed tapes confirms that at 9:16 NEADS was receiving confirmation of the tail number of the United 175 flight.[xxx]
Furthermore, at 9:16, the plane had not yet even been hijacked. In fact, the sounds of the initial struggle on board United 93 that resulted in its hijacking are not audible on the air traffic radio frequency in Cleveland Center until 9:28. As late as 9:25, moreover, according to FAA controller transcripts, the pilot of United 93 radioed in: “United ninety-three checking three-five-oh (35,000 feet).”
The “ground truth” revealed by the tapes, as corroborated by Commission staff, also belies the official version of the response to United 93 that is built on the early notification time. “Air War Over America,” for instance, the 1st Air Force’s official history of 9/11, offers the following accounts by two of the key NORAD participants:
(Colonel Robert Marr, NEADS Commander): “With all available alert fighters in the air, Marr and his crew were still faced with United Flight 93. The plane was headed west, so controllers began looking for any other fighter jets that might be nearby. `We don’t have fighters that way and we think he’s headed toward Detroit or Chicago,’ Marr says. `I’m thinking Chicago is the target and know that Selfridge Air National Guard Base (Mich.) has F-16s in the air. We contacted them so they could head 93 off at the pass. The idea is to get in there, close in on him and convince him to turn… As United Airlines Flight 93 was going out, we received the clearance to kill if need be. In fact, General Arnold’s words almost verbatim were: `We will take lives in the air to save lives on the ground.’” [xxxi]
(General Larry Arnold, CONR Commander): “…we watched the 93 track as it meandered around the Ohio-Pennsylvania area and started to turn south toward DC. By now the Pentagon has been hit and we have aircraft on orbit… They are now orbiting over Washington, DC, and have been for a while. As United 93 headed toward DC, the desire is to move the fighters toward that aircraft.”[xxxii]
The record demonstrates, however, that no-one at any level in NORAD (or DOD) ever “watched the 93 track” start to turn south toward DC. The only track that NEADS watched was the Delta 1989 track, which turned toward Cleveland. In fact, NORAD never saw United 93 at all. The Selfridge fighters were contacted not regarding United 93, but Delta 1989. Most important, NORAD certainly never “received the clearance to kill if need be” on United 93; indeed, as determined by Commission staff, as late as 10:10 the ROE orders given by the NEADS Mission Crew Commander were “negative clearance to shoot” regarding targets over Washington, DC.[xxxiii]
10. CONCLUSION
The primary source material from 9/11 – the contemporaneous logs, other records, and tapes obtained by the Commission largely through subpoena and set forth at length in this monograph – reveal a sequence of events that had never been made public prior to the Commission’s June 17, 2004 hearing. That sequence reveals that the military received hijack notification on American 11 nine minutes prior to its crash, and no hijack notification on any of the other flights prior to their crashes. The FAA’s failure to notify NORAD or NEADS on United 175 is explained by its preoccupation with American 11; its failure to notify NORAD or NEADS on American 77 is explained by its loss of radar and radio contact with the aircraft. More difficult to understand is the failure to notify the military or request assistance on United 93, when FAA headquarters knew about the hijacking within six minutes of its occurrence and twenty-nine minutes prior to its crash. See Summary Tables.
At 10:02 that morning, [with one of the Trade Center Towers having collapsed and the other in flames, with the Pentagon burning and confusion reigning at the highest levels of government and command, and with a desperate struggle taking place, unbeknownst to the military, in the skies over Pennsylvania,] an officer on the floor at NEADS was recorded observing, “This is a new type of war.”
New type of war.mp3
He was right. America’s air defense system was unprepared for the 9/11 attacks. FAA controllers and managers and the NEADS air defenders struggled, under difficult circumstances, to improvise a homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge they had never encountered and had never trained to meet.
[At the end of the day, however, although the decisions they had made that morning ran counter to the existing training and rules, and were made under the most intense pressure, the NORAD air defenders were well aware of the historical significance of those decisions. Prepared or not, they had ushered all of us into a new era.]
0911 National terrorist day.mp3
Cf. www.rutgerslawreview.com/2011/full-audio-transcript
Cf. http://www.rutgerslawreview.com/2011/a-new-type-of-war/
For the first time, the full audio recordings of communications between military and civilian air traffic controllers as they were dealing with the hijackings on Sept. 11, 2001, have been made public. The multimedia document, published by the Rutgers Law Review, provides a rare real-time look at how government agencies were responding as the hijacking of the four planes was unfolding.
"We have a problem here. We have hijacked aircraft headed towards New York and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up here to help us out," a worker at Boston Center's Traffic Management Unit said at 8:37 a.m., according to the recordings. No planes had struck any targets yet.
The official on the other end of the line, unaware they were minutes away from witnessing firsthand the worst terror attack in U.S. history, asked if it was all a test.
"No, this is not an exercise, this is not a test," the worker said.
While some of the recordings had been played during the 9/11 Commission hearings in 2004, other parts had not been heard before they were transferred to the National Archives after the commission was shut down the same year.
Another portion showed the abject horror from officials as they witnessed United Flight 175 slamming into the World Trade Center.
"Hey, can you look out your window right now?... Can you see a guy at about 4,000 feet, about five East of the airport right now?... Do you see that guy -- look -- is he descending into the building also?" one official asks another. Seconds after the person on the other end of the line says yes to all the hurried questions, the plane explodes inside the South Tower of the World Trade Center.
"Wow. Another one just hit it hard. Another one just hit the World Trade," someone says in the background of the recording. "Oh my God."
The 9/11 Commission staff had started compiling the recordings and transcripts into the multimedia document released today but had not completed it in time to be released with the 9/11 Commission report.
Miles Kara, a retired Army colonel and investigator for the 9/11 Commission, aided by a team from the Rutgers School of Law whose dean is former 9/11 Commission Senior Counsel John Farmer, dug out the original electronic files and completed what commission staff called the "audio monograph".
According to the New York Times, which first reported on the release of these recordings, one key tape remains unreleased: the recording from the last half hour in the cockpit of United Flight 93 that crashed in Pennsylvania instead of its intended target in Washington DC. Though it was played at the trial for one of the plotters, the families of the passengers who took on the hijackers requested the audio not be made public.
Posts
