Since the insurgency is doing so poorly, you may wonder if AQ has a back up plan. It turns out they do.
The Islamists will turn the world into "wildernesses" where only those under jihadi rule enjoy security. According to al Qaeda's chief theoretician, Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, this is the world depicted in his new book "Governance in the Wilderness" (Edarat al-Wahsh). From the sounds of it, it looks like they see the world much as apocalyptics, and other end-time groups do. If correct, AQ is changing its strategy. AQ has failed in its tactical objectives. The Coalition is making slow, but marked progress. AQ has failed to obtain a needed homeland, or land. Something must be done.
Naji divides the jihadi movement into five concentric circles: ranging from first Sunni Salafi (traditionalist) Muslims (who, though not personally violent, are prepared to give moral and material support to militants); to Islamist groups with national rather than pan-Islamist agendas; (such as the Palestinian Hamas and the Filipino Moro Liberation Front). The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 meanes that the "infidel" rules today via native proxies. Even the Taliban has not established, or rather re-established the Caliphate so they failed. Today, the Islamic movement must be global, fighting everywhere, all the time, and on all fronts.
After 9/11, the infidel U.S. failed to collapse. On the contrary, the "Great Satan" slapped back, hard. That said, the smaller and slower path but with steadier attacks has been advocated by Ayman al-Zawahiri, AQ No. 2 leader. The "near" jihad targets oppressive Muslim regions close to home first. Naji states that the low-intensity near battles must extend the war wherever there is a significant Muslim presence.
Islamist "wilderness" zones will create a parallel society alongside existing nation-states. If we are formless, we can not be defeated.
Daily life would be insecure, unstable, and unsafe. This would be a major departure from the previous AQ strategy of a few, spectacular, impressive attacks such as 9/11.
Parallel sharia societies would exert pressure on non-Muslims to submit and thus the killings, kidnapping, and local atrocities would end. The tactics would be a major change but the strategy is based on the same basic AQ point. Naji believes that, subjected to constant intimidation and fear of death, most non-Muslims (especially in the West) would submit: "The West has no stomach for a long fight."
Naji identifies that the United States is the practically the soke, exclusive target.
Naji targets the tactical objectives of oilfields, sea and airports, tourist facilities, and especially banking and financial services in "a very long war," a war of attrition.
Naji's theory is based on Mohammed who practiced the tactic by making his enemies in Medina, where he ran his version of the "wilderness," pay "the maximum price" for any deviance, and through constant raids on trade caravans belonging to his enemies in Mecca.
According to Naji, America lacks the will for a long war. The "infidel" loves life and treats it as an endless feast. Jihadis have to ruin that feast and persuade the "infidel" to abandon this world in exchange for greater rewards in the next.
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