But the historical analogy does not fit. The Congress' first primary objectives were to:
contain France after decades of war;
achieve a balance of power between Europe's great powers;
uphold the territorial arrangements made at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 and in doing so prevent the rise of another Napoleon-esque figure which would result in another continent wide war.
None of the objectives fit the requirements of effective U.S. foreign policy. There is no nation-state, such as France that needs containing; there is nothing advantageous for U.S. interests to simply maintain parity with other leading nations; and, no territory will contain a Napoleon-like figure to any one territory.
A Napoleon or any monster like him today is much more lethal today given the phenomenon of Islamofascism. Second, the U.S. has prospered during a period of American hegemony which is only more difficult today given the difficulties of the U.S. economy, ongoing international threats, and Islamofascism. Boundaries are not barriers today when you consider the role of the media in the information war and the porous nature of territories as in the case of places like Pakistan.
Van Evera equates the danger of a WMD and Napoleon as a threat-from-below. But as many nations are already engaged in actively defending themselves especially since the threats have often moved beyond threats to actual bombings and killings. Yet, the existing bulwarks such as NATO have proved less than successful in thwarting attacks. Van Evera seems to simply state the obvious. Nations need to cooperate. We already know that. The trick is to get them to move in harmony since they are not.
It is unilateral U.S. action that Van Evera reserves for especial disdain. But what is the alternative? America was under attack following 9/11 and if anything the U.S. dragged its feet, or failed to heed the warnings from Bin Laden experts such as Michael Scheuer during the Clinton administration. In large part the Bush Doctrine arouse from being attacked directly and during war no nation can wait for an international Concert before acting.
Van Evera's idealistic faith in diplomacy is laughable. Here is one such precious gem: "the United States should speak in respectful tones to other governments" (p. 19, Leffler). Maybe if the U.S. said "pretty please" to Hugo Chavez he wouldn't be such a bad guy after all. There are significant portions of the world, the lands where our enemies live, that openly applauded the attacks on 9/11. We can't wait for friends or enemies to take decisive action when our national security is on the line.
Van Evera simply recommends diplomacy to stop WMD. Every sane nation desires this but he never explains how the failed diplomacies of the past will now work. He just knows that Bush didn't excercise enough of it. Even our staunchest allies fail to deliver. For example, in July of this year, Japan backed out of an earlier commitment to dispatch its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to Afghanistan now that the security situation has declined. The self-limitation of allies does not hinder AQAM (al-Qaeda and Allied Movements).
Another unexplained notion is that we have to have ideas to combat al Qaeda. This will convince them? Hardly. No war of ideas will convince AQ that we are right.
As things may get worse Van Evera has the "selective engagement" of Robert Art. This is all well and good but there is no way to distinguish Art from Bush since George would consider himself as targeting the right people and he has selectively chosen to attack the worse threats.
Nations selectively attack their biggest foes. Van Evera approves of Bismarck between 1871-1890 because he "bolstered peace" (p. 24). What Van Evera does not mention is that Bismarck had defeated each of his enemies-–Denmark, Austria, and France-–in isolation. After 1871 Bismarck was committed to preserving the peace of Europe only because he had already provoked and/or defeated his threats, selectively.
Since the U.S. suffered only 1.7% of war deaths in World War I, and only 3.6% of the deaths in World War II, this is evidence for Van Evera that the U.S. paid a relatively small price while forging great alliances that can work again. The only thing it seems to prove is that the U.S. assisted others in their life and death struggle that if successful, our common enemies would have come for us, and, of course Japan had hit the U.S. mainland.
Van Evera gets the historial parallels wrong so it is not surprising that his arguments for the present conflicts do not fit.
Cf. Leffler, Melvyn P., and Jeffrey W. Legro, To Lead the World: American Strategy After the Bush Doctrine.
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