AQ Pressed in Af-Pak Region, Expands to Central Asia

An undated image from a video released by the U.S. military claims to show an al Qaeda in Iraq training operation involving child recruits. Graphic source: AP Photo/US Military

Al Qaeda has said to have successfully established a network for recruiting boys as young as 12 from across central Asia according to senior security officials from the Middle East and as revealed to CBS News.

Last May, a senior Pakistani security official screened a video clip to CBS News documenting a boy, barely 12 years old, using a machete to severe the head of a middle-aged man whom militants suspected of being a spy for the U.S.

The central Asian nations, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, appear to be the most likely areas to recruit AQ adherents because of lack of Coalition presence and the largely Muslim population.

The anonymous security spokesperson indicated that there are "maybe a few hundred such cases."

With the Coalition pressing in on AQ in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the organization is seeking areas of less resistance.

July Order of Battle Iraq

Graphic source: The Long War Journal

On this day of liberty I publish the July Order of Battle in Iraq. Most of the Order concerns the increasing rate of Iraqi defenders of their country. The Coalition is standing down and turning over security all over the country to native defenders.

Note on How the Wars of the Past Still Determine How We Fight, How We Live, and How We Think

Yes, this is one of the preeminent historians of war writing today. Yes, we should expect a great deal from his work. With these points in mind, Victor Davis Hanson, former professor of classics at California State University, Fresno, describes how particular battles persist and therefore ripple through the centuries. In Ripples of Battle, Hanson begins on a engrossing and fascinating starting point, his own family military history, and weaves the fateful account of his father's first cousin who was to die tragically, and as Hanson argues, unnecessarily, on Okinawa. His cousin died without progeny and his branch of the family ended. Hanson speculates later on in the work who is know what kind of contribution the dead may have made. He seems to be aware of the futility, though tragic necessity for war. War is central in the human experience. This is the high point of the work. It is written with a great deal of passion and verve.

As to the remainder of the work, it is less successful, and in summary reverse order, Hanson reviews the Athenian defeat at Delium in 424 BCE that brought tactical innovations to infantry fighting; it also assured--which is a flaw in Hanson's argument--the influence of the philosophy of Socrates, who fought well in the battle. Nearly twenty-three hundred years later, the debacle at Shiloh and the death of the brilliant Southern strategist Albert Sidney Johnson inspired a sense of fateful tragedy that would endure and stymie Southern culture for decades. The Northern victory would also bolster the reputation of William Tecumseh Sherman, and most critically according to Hanson, inspire Lew Wallace to pen the widely popular Ben Hur. And, most poignantly, the agony of Okinawa forced the Japanese to sanction state-supported suicide, a tactic so fanatical, it haunts our view of non-Western combatants to this day. Okinawa also provoked the appropriate level of response, the controversial deployment of atomic weapons.

The odd thing of Hanson's argument is that he loses force the further back in history he reaches. He correctly places Okinawa front and center in American thinking that led to dropping atomic bombs on the Japanese mainland. Okinawa was far bloodier than American field commanders expected and he shows that most likely only the unfortunate death of General Simon Bolivar Buckner, during the battle, prevented an inquiry into his unimaginative and flawed tactics that did nothing to avoid the unwarranted deaths of so many Marines. Buckner ignored the credible alternatives of his staff and plunged many more to their deaths without cause.

Hanson's argument is less effective than his review of Okinawa in his account of Shiloh. Shiloh was of course a tragedy but he does not make a clear connection between Johnson's death, and the brilliance of General Nathan Bedford Forrest at the battle. The mistake is that by simply relating a cataclysmic event, and drawing a connection to much of what follows chronologically, is not enough. Shiloh was a tragedy on so many levels, the amount of casualties, the unmitigated carnage, and who is to say that Forrest would have become the leader of the Ku Klux Klan regardless of his important role at Shiloh. The Northern victory of course bolstered the reputation of Sherman and he is widely recognized for inventing a more comprehensive, if not brutal tactic of devastating the enemy's infrastructure to demolish your opponent, an American military trademark since then. The fact that Wallace wrote the incredibly popular Ben Hur as an allegory and defense of his flawed role in the battle would escape later readers. In fact, in more recent times, the story is best known for the classic film adaptation, and is no longer even associated with a Civil War general, much less Shiloh. Hanson gives Americans too much credit, and attributes a much profounder appreciation of history than the story would warrant.

Even more troubling is Hanson's review of the Athenian defeat at Delium. I'm with him when he argues that the battle initiated tactical innovations to infantry fighting. However, I must part company when he states categorically, that since Socrates lived to tell the tale of his personal involvement in the battle, he therefore has been a huge influence in philosophy. Once again, he mistakes the personal appearance of a participant in a battle as proof of how wars determine our thinking and how we live.

The failure is the lack of evidence which is the hallmark of historical analysis. As Plato relates the ideas of Socrates, did Socrates argue this point? Did Socrates agree that Delium was a personal watershed? Is there any evidence for such a statement? It is true of course that we only have evidence of Socrates through second-hand sources, since he did not write, but surely we should some Socratic statements indicating that this traumatic battle is the wellspring of his thought.

In the final analysis, we know where Hanson is going with all this. He wants to argue that 9/11 is a defining moment for the West. The West will fight vociferously, will think of non-Westeners as we have in the past, and will determine how we will fight the war on terror. In a final section, this is what he has been driving at which he reveals. However, it is simply still an open question of how the defining moment of 9/11 will be addressed. We are too close to the events in question and since the West is characterized at least as much by its ambiguity, defeatism, and misunderstandings in the face of a resurgent Middle Eastern Islam, Hanson's argument fails to persuade. If he were correct, the West's response would be swift, ferocious, and devastating. That day may come but it has not arrived, not yet anyway.

Note on Benjamin & Simon, Sacred Terror

A "treasure trove" (p. xii) exists of information about sacred terror. The authors note that much of their information is readily available in 50,000 pages of testimony against terrorists therefore their information is hidden right before us.

What has not happened though is that the government institutions, sworn to our safety, have not responded well enough or quickly enough to protect us. In this contentious debate various scapegoats have been found but upon reading the work I think the blame can be spread equally amongst both administrations: Democrat and Republican, Clinton and Bush. There are plenty of mistakes to go around.

The institutions of federal protection, the NSA, the FBI, the CIA, the DOD, the State Department, and both White House administrations failed to share critical data and collaborate. This is a major stumbling block and a "failure of imagination" on the part of government institutions to recognize, and respond appropriately, to a new post-Cold War threat.

The roots of contemporary jihadist terrorism are profound. In 1990, Meir Kahane, the Jewish leader of the JDL (Jewish Defense League) was murdered which gave birth to the brand of terrorism reflected in, and which influenced 9/11. By dating contemporary terrorism so deeply, the authors are making the point that terrorism has been with us for some time. Even the first WTC bombing in 1993 though failed to garnish an appropriate response against Middle Eastern terrorism. Not even an attack on CIA headquarters itself a month and a day later, by a Pakistani Mir Aimal Kansi, who killed two and wounded three, failed to elicit a response by policy-makers. They did not heed the message jihadists sent.

The authors note that this violent, contemporary brand of terrorism was spawned some time ago, with Ibn Taymiyya, b. 1269, the Wahhabists, and more recently, by Sayyid Qutb. The "Warrior Prince," Bin Laden, was born and bred in this strain of Islam. The movement he began, by the raiders and in the fields, attempted to capture and hold land according to this theology, against the "near enemy."

The question is: why were American policy-makers so slow to react given this history and the roots of violent Islam? In the 90s, the authors note the paradigm shift that took place amongst the field operatives and mid-level analysts such as Richard Clarke. This shift did not occur amongst the high-level decision-makers though. The higher-level policy makers remain mired in only recognizing the terrorism of the state-sponsored variety. Under the radar, then, terroristic efforts were taking a more ominous and deadly turn. Policy makers still considered terrorism a low-level threat and sought state sponsorship, something eschewed by jihadists.

During the same period, overseas assets of the U.S. were attacked and Americans were killed, yet these incidents were not recognized by policy-makers, as the lower and middle-level analysts identified, as part of a larger whole, a jihad against the West begun by Middle-Eastern Muslims.

Policy-makers did not connect the dots. Only in 1995 do we have the first mention of Bin Laden stated by a U.S. official (p. 235). During the same period, the CIA was in transition, if not disarray, and the Clinton administration was unresponsive to warnings about a more significant jihadist movement afoot.

When Clinton did respond, as in the '98 al-Shifa bombing, Bill was denounced by the media as a 'wag the dog' President. The mainstream news services failed in their duty to investigate and reveal the newsworthy story of rising jihadist sentiment and the violent terrorists who emerged at the time.

Bin Laden at least began to be viewed as a more significant threat during the Clinton administration, in fact, missiles were readied three times to take him out (p. 380). The period was marked unfortunately by legal ambiguities, and hand-wringing which tied the Administration's hands and effective options failed to develop in American security services to eliminate Bin Laden.

The CIA did not develop options and assets in al Qaeda's region which may have initiated effective means against Bin Laden. George Tenet, personally popular though marginally effective as CIA chief, began to advocate the necessity of addressing the rising Bin Laden threat.

Their counterparts at the FBI were in even worse shape to pursue Bin Laden or jihadists. Their crime-fighting expertise in fact worked against them in developing an appropriate response to Bin Laden. AQ (al Qaeda) was out of their bailiwick. FBI Director Louis Freeh performed dreadfully in countering terrorism, and although there were individuals of excellence who pointed out the AQ threat, such as the FBI's John O'Neill, these prescient analysts were drowned out by organizational lethargy and incompetence.

Since Tenet came in late to the game during the Clinton-Bush transition, he began to sound the alarm about Bin Laden. The Bush administration was slow to recognize the Bin Laden threat, failed to act on AQ effectively, and did not promote the proper tools to handle AQ.

Both administrations failed to protect Americans. The policy makers dedicated to security, the CIA and the FBI in particular, did not collaborate and develop an effective counter-strategy. Only in the field operatives and mid-level analysts did the more violent strain of Islam become identified as a more significant threat to American interests. The authors have traced the violent, and older strains of Islam that have become much more popular, and represent the mainstream view of contemporary Islam. The authors make a compelling case for examining both the evidence and the incidents which led us to our current clash between Islamism and the West. The quagmire that we are in is due to the West failing to understand the severity and the violent opposition of Middle Eastern Muslims.

"Mookie" Chameleon

Widely reported on this blog has been the recent dismantling of Sadr's militia. Omar Fadhil, co-author of the blog Iraq the Model, and a two time winner of the Weblog Awards, cogently summarized on The Long War Journal the next moves for "Mookie," as Sadr has been referred to.

Through his decision to trim Mahdi Army, Sadr hopes to salvage some of Mahdi Army’s best trained and most loyal units, and put them under one command to operate in a secretive manner and, ostensibly, only against US targets. If Muqtada’s plan is to make his militia operate in manner akin to al Qaeda Iraq by keeping a low profile and using selective targeting of opponents and occasional spectacular attacks like the recent car-bombing in Hurriyah district, then Mahdi Army will continue to be a source of trouble; but not of the magnitude seen 2006 and 2007. However, the problem for Sadr is that al Qaeda Iraq itself is on the verge of being defeated; trying to copy the methods of a defeated power isn’t likely to lead Sadr to a better end.

Other possible rationales for Sadr’s decision to disband the larger Mahdi Army include:

• Shedding extra unnecessary “weight:” The current larger Mahdi Army has many thousands of poorly trained foot soldiers. Those were proven to be effective in paralyzing life and spreading fear in several cities over the last few years. However, Muqtada’s ability to deploy these mobs to take over the streets has been drastically compromised following the recent crackdowns by US troops and Iraqi security forces. Sadr may get rid of these soldiers simply because they are no longer suitable for his goals. These untrained mobs could easily act as a shadow army for the shadow government Sadr wanted to establish, but they are not qualified to be members of a professional guerrilla army.

• Leaderless resistance: Sadr’s announcement could be a trick: vowing to fight the occupier until victory or death, while concurrently giving this “honor” to a small, select group. He’s basically telling his followers that fighting is good, but you shouldn’t do it. The result would be that some or many of those followers will indeed go against his orders and continue fighting. In this case, Sadr gets the service he needs from those men, while maintaining the ability to claim that Mahdi Army is not responsible and those men do not represent him.

• Preventing infiltration by informants/Iraqi security forces: Sadr’s emphasis on secrecy in his letter may indicate that he’s trying to limit the number of people that have access to information concerning the planning, operations, structure, command and control, logistics, and other secretive information of the Mahdi Army in order to prevent any security breaches. Sadr’s advisors may have convinced him that the smaller the army, the less likely it will be infiltrated, and the less likely that civilian locals will be able to get information to relay to Iraqi security forces and US troops. Muqtada’s fear from infiltration may have been exacerbated by the formation of Awakening groups in his main stronghold of Sadr City; especially that many of the Awakening men are relatives or neighbors of Mahdi Army fighters, if not were themselves members of the Mahdi Army.

• Emulating Hezbollah: Since Hezbollah plays a significant role in training and organizing the Mahdi army, this decision may be an attempt to reform the militia and make it evolve into something similar to Hezbollah. It is common knowledge that Hezbollah maintains a force of 2-3 thousand well-trained, active fighters prepared for immediate duty. Thousands of others Hezbollah operative serve in the social, financial and other civil society networks of the group, in addition to a reserve paramilitary force. In fact, rebuilding the Mahdi army following Hezbollah’s example of a clear separation between the armed and civil wings is what Sadr literally said in his letter a few weeks back.

Whatever the rationale, it is clear that Sadr is scrambling to make adjustments to his plans. The results of the recent fighting with the Iraqi security forces and US troops rendered the Mahdi army incapable of sustaining Sadr’s Plan ‘A,’ forcing him to accept a new plan with a smaller army. Cf. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/07/analysis.php.

My personal view is the latter, the Mahdi are evolving into a Hezbollah-type counter-society directed by Iran. With the failure of AQ to be competitive, and largely viewed as a foreign oppressor, AQ did not capture the hearts and minds of Iraqis. Sadr, due to the respect bestowed on his father, is still seen as an Iraqi power player. He will sacrifice anyone he needs to, as did Arafat, in order to advance the agenda of his co-religionists, the Shi'ite Iranians.

Update on AQ Theorist Naji

Abu Bakr Naji, who I recently commented on here, portrayed AQ differently in times past. In 2004, in his book, The Management of Savagery, Abu Bakr Naji did not simply advance a religious agenda, but a careful reading of Western political theories.

Naji says that the jihadis had to provoke the United States to invade a country in the Middle East which proved to be hauntingly true and he argued that this is the only way jihadists could prevail.

We know the result: 1) Muslims railed against local governments allied with the U.S.; 2) the U.S. aura of invincibility was tarnished through the media; and 3) sympathy for the jihadis was created since they are viewed as standing up to Crusader aggression. Moreover, the invasion would bleed the U.S. economy and sap its military power, leading to social unrest at home and its ultimate withdrawal from the Middle East.

In his previous work though, just as in the latest one, The plan is to conduct small- to medium-scale attacks on crucial infrastructure (like oil or tourism), which will cause the government to draw in its security forces. Chaos or "savagery" will erupt in the unpoliced areas. Then, the jihadis will move into these security vacuums and provide basic services to people, who will welcome an end to the instability. The final result is the same, a single global state ruled by a pious Muslim, the caliph, who will implement a strict interpretation of sharia.

Naji deserves a listen. He was correct as events unfolded before, he may well be right again.

Insurgency Gone, Criminals Sought

Graphic source: Michael Gisick/S&S

Iraqi troops pass a poster memorializing fallen Jaish al-Mahdi fighters in Shula.

With Jaish al-Mahdi banished, the Arabic name for al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, Coalition troops are walking the neighborhood to root out the last vestiges of the insurgency. American troops don't care for the name, Army, or miltia for example, "I don’t like to call them that," said Lt. Col. Gregory Baine, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment in eastern Baghdad. "They’re criminals, thugs, terrorists. ‘Militia’ could have a positive connotation," according to a statement in Stars and Stripes.

Comforting to a Theater Near You

Since the insurgency is doing so poorly, you may wonder if AQ has a back up plan. It turns out they do.

The Islamists will turn the world into "wildernesses" where only those under jihadi rule enjoy security. According to al Qaeda's chief theoretician, Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, this is the world depicted in his new book "Governance in the Wilderness" (Edarat al-Wahsh). From the sounds of it, it looks like they see the world much as apocalyptics, and other end-time groups do. If correct, AQ is changing its strategy. AQ has failed in its tactical objectives. The Coalition is making slow, but marked progress. AQ has failed to obtain a needed homeland, or land. Something must be done.

Naji divides the jihadi movement into five concentric circles: ranging from first Sunni Salafi (traditionalist) Muslims (who, though not personally violent, are prepared to give moral and material support to militants); to Islamist groups with national rather than pan-Islamist agendas; (such as the Palestinian Hamas and the Filipino Moro Liberation Front). The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 meanes that the "infidel" rules today via native proxies. Even the Taliban has not established, or rather re-established the Caliphate so they failed. Today, the Islamic movement must be global, fighting everywhere, all the time, and on all fronts.

After 9/11, the infidel U.S. failed to collapse. On the contrary, the "Great Satan" slapped back, hard. That said, the smaller and slower path but with steadier attacks has been advocated by Ayman al-Zawahiri, AQ No. 2 leader. The "near" jihad targets oppressive Muslim regions close to home first. Naji states that the low-intensity near battles must extend the war wherever there is a significant Muslim presence.

Islamist "wilderness" zones will create a parallel society alongside existing nation-states. If we are formless, we can not be defeated.

Daily life would be insecure, unstable, and unsafe. This would be a major departure from the previous AQ strategy of a few, spectacular, impressive attacks such as 9/11.

Parallel sharia societies would exert pressure on non-Muslims to submit and thus the killings, kidnapping, and local atrocities would end. The tactics would be a major change but the strategy is based on the same basic AQ point. Naji believes that, subjected to constant intimidation and fear of death, most non-Muslims (especially in the West) would submit: "The West has no stomach for a long fight."

Naji identifies that the United States is the practically the soke, exclusive target.

Naji targets the tactical objectives of oilfields, sea and airports, tourist facilities, and especially banking and financial services in "a very long war," a war of attrition.

Naji's theory is based on Mohammed who practiced the tactic by making his enemies in Medina, where he ran his version of the "wilderness," pay "the maximum price" for any deviance, and through constant raids on trade caravans belonging to his enemies in Mecca.

According to Naji, America lacks the will for a long war. The "infidel" loves life and treats it as an endless feast. Jihadis have to ruin that feast and persuade the "infidel" to abandon this world in exchange for greater rewards in the next.

Note on Keegan, Intelligence in War

Nothing about the prose seemed compelling though there were points of interest that are notable in this work. Keegan took classic incidents in war where intelligence proved crucial for the action--Napoleonic wars, Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, the invention of the wireless, Crete in WW II, Midway, the Atlantic War in WW II, and German advances late in WW II--then, he notes the limitation of intelligence and how it did not prove to be the crucial factor in the outcome. On Crete, for example, the British had detailed intelligence and yet, lost the engagement. He makes the point that force predominates over intelligence, advance knowledge or inside information does not always determine the outcome. More importantly, in the section on intelligence after 1945, he points out that intelligence can not ascertain the appropriate course of action. Saddam proved to be exceptionally obtuse and the Coalition acted on the limited intelligence available to them. The knowledge of intelligence can only go so far. Force is required although the popularizers of intelligence, mostly from novels, gives us the impression that intelligence reveals all. It does not. The key to Keegan's work, as a pre-eminent military historian, is in the subtitle: "The value--and limitations--of what the military can learn about the enemy."

Note on Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides

As important as Thucydides is, the difficulty for the layperson to grasp him and understand his work, is to overcome certain limitations in his presentation of the war. Robert Strassler's supplemental edition provides resources by providing a commentary of the narrative, and the necessary background of an easily misunderstood cultural tradition that we do not share in order to provide a useful context for modern readers. The work is amply bolstered by a plethora of unique maps, substantive appendices by leading classical scholars, such as Victor Davis Hanson, explanatory marginalia, and a helpful and complete index. Thucydides is much more easily understood by using this volume.

Note on Kagan, The Peloponnesian War

Along with using Robert Strassler's, The Landmark Thucydides, while reading the original text in translation, Donald Kagan's, The Peloponnesian War, is a masterpiece of elucidation. The text is clear and well-written while expounding on the War mostly covered by Thucydides. Kagan also is supplemented by maps not available in Strassler that I found extremely helpful to understand Thucydides while imagining the personalities involved, such as Alcibiades, the terrain, and battle conditions. This is a masterful one-volume work for general readers of the period which is much more than a simple summary of his four-volume corpus for specialists published by Cornell University Press.

Jihadists Denounce Osama and AQ

Graphic source: al-Khansa

Umm Osama, the founder of Al-Qaeda's first women-only website is said to be announcing her renunciation of the organization on Saudi TV. The al-Khansa women's website have denounced jihadism. An interview with the Egyptian-born Abu Azza al-Ansari will also be aired; he was the director of the al-Qaeda linked 'Echoes of Jihad' online magazine.

There Goes the Neighborhood: AQ on the Run

Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden’s terrorist organisation, driven out of Afghanistan and defeated in Iraq, is re-emerging in Pakistan, Somalia, and Algeria as safe havens for training, operational planning, and recruiting.

15 of 18 Iraq Benchmarks "Satisfactory"

Iraq achieved 15 of 18 benchmarks and are now "satisfactory," almost twice of what it determined to be the case a year ago. The May 2008 report card determines that only two of the benchmarks, enacting and implementing laws to disarm militias and distribute oil revenues, are unsatisfactory.

Iraq's Violence Down to U.S. Levels

Iraq's gun related violence dropped dramatically to just over 6 deaths per day in June. If adjusted for population this would result in a murder rate of 8/100,000 people. The murder rate in the US is 4 per 100,000 people.

Summary of June 2008

As a new monthly feature I will review the past month and try to summarize. The Middle East and Islamist issues predominated. Pakistan has gotten more unstable this month.

Iraq has made cautious but certain progress this month in terms of stability. Better estimates have emerged to document the downfall of Sadr and the Mahdi Defeat. As the insurgents have been quieted, a new call for the upcoming elections and the progress of democracy is possible. Iraqi Kurdistan continues to be an area of support. Overt and covert operations against Iran may be helping the situation in Iraq. Arabs and others are slowly returning and investing in Iraq which should help the country in its battle against foreign invaders and Iran. And finally, the re-built Golden Dome would help brighten Samarra. No, wait, the biggest story as a summary of the month before is what all Americans should be cheering: monthly death toll lowest since 2004. We have measurable progress and the job the military has done is just awesome.

The American scene seems just as confused as always. Congress continues to chips away at 4th Amendment rights and proves no more successful in thwarting terrorists by any policy changes. The point is well-documentd in that the War on Terror has lost the interest of Americans, and according to Michael F. Scheuer with have no clear-cut effective policy to combat insurgents anyway. White Europeans are being trained by AQ but while the Court continues to strike out at American freedoms, the government can not even keep Congressional computers safe from the prying eyes of China. In fact, the Mars landing site was hacked twice. History textbooks are fraught with downplaying the threat of Islamism for the sake of political correctness. The government is not doing its job in protecting Americans. The nation does not realize that we are losing the information war and whittling away at our freedoms. This will work against us in the fight against a generational Islamic jihad. We could learn a lesson or two from the British academics who speaks out attack the cancer of Islamism within their midst.

The campaign is heating up so the presidential election may garnish more attention. For example, Obama's cousin declares Islam to be the only True religion so I would hope more people would press Obama for more information about his ideas and backgroun. Obama’s Communist mentor has been identified and finally perhaps the Web is finally going to really chane things during campaigning since there is evidence of the popularity and change that the Internet has provoked.

Some of my recent reading has included Thucydides, Ronnie and Nancy Reagan, Eurydice, the Olympics, education (Wissner-Gross), military history, History of MS, and Napoleon.

RIP: Hey Bo Diddley!

Pakistan Lives Up to Historical Fragmentation

Pakistan's military reminds me of France, no victories, and I am not optimistic that they will prevail against the Taliban. Recent polls indicate about 60% of Pakistanis, nationwide, support the Taliban. And, since it is a state founded on religious fanaticism, Pakistanis are most likely to see the Taliban as co-religionists and as such part of the Ummah. The Pakistani government will be hard-pressed to do well against the Taliban.

The regions separated into India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have long been divided along religious lines. Around 1000,

Muslim Turks and Afghans pushed into India. They were fierce warriors with a tradition of conquest. Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni pillaged much of the north, but he did not settle there. In the late 1100s, though, the sultan, or Muslim ruler, of Ghur defeated Hindu armies across the northern plain and made Delhi his capital. From there, his successors organized a sultanate, or land ruled by a sultan. The Delhi sultanate, which lasted from 1206 to 1526, marked the start of Muslim rule in northern India.

Why did the Muslim invaders triumph? They won on the battlefield in part because Muslim mounted archers had far greater mobility than Hindu forces, who rode slow-moving war elephants. The Muslim faith also united them.

Akbar was perhaps the greatest ruler in the region. Raised in Afghanistan, he was illiterate but at the age of 15, in 1556, his father was dead, and the boy became padshah—“ruler of the empire.” Under the guidance of his regent, Akbar immediately began seizing territory lost after his father’s death and his territory expanded dramatically.

In the late 1600s, one of Akbar's successor's, the emperor Aurangzeb resumed the persecution of Hindus. Economic hardships increased under heavy taxes, and discontent sparked revolts against Mughal rule. This climate of discontent helped European traders gain a foothold in the once powerful Mughal empire.

The Hindu tradition re-asserted itself but with a significant Muslim minority.

The two countries were more or less united then until Pakistan gained independence in 1947, at the same time as India. However, Pakistan was a divided country.

Pakistan has traditionally been characterized with a weak central government. In addition, there were sharp disagreements between Islamist factions—people who believe that society and government should strictly follow sharia—and those who wanted greater separation between religion and state. Repeatedly, Pakistan’s rulers, often backed by the military, dismissed elected governments. Sometimes, the military simply seized power.

During the 1980s, the war in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion drove over a million Afghan refugees into Pakistan. Many of these Afghan refugees turned to Islamism because of their anger at the non-Muslim Soviet invaders. Many young men from these communities joined the mujahedin rebels fighting Soviet forces. Pakistan’s Islamic fundamentalists gained power by forming ties with Afghan refugees. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, these Islamists rejected U.S. intrusion in the Middle East and in Pakistan. During the 1990s, Pakistan backed Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, which supported the terrorist group Al Qaeda. However, when the United States launched a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 2001, Pakistan’s government nominally has supported the United States.

Pakistan's efforts against the Taliban have been tepid; the military is viewed as weak and indecisive.

Since July 2007 seven moves against the Taliban have been ineffective.

Islamabad, July 2007:

The Pakistani government ordered a siege and subsequent full scale assault on the Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, in Islamabad. Extremists retook the Lal Masjid just one day after it was reopened.

North Waziristan, July - August 2007:

Fighting flared in North Waziristan immediate after the assault on the Lal Masjid. The Pakistani military attempted to hold territory but were repelled and they were forced out only to remain garrisoned.

South Waziristan, August - September 2007:

The Taliban conducted its most successful military operation during 2007 in South Waziristan. Baitullah Mehsud rose to leadership during this time. In mid-Decemebr, a council of 40 senior Taliban leaders established the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan -- the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan -- and appointed Baitullah its leader.

North Waziristan, October 2007:

The Pakistani military and the Taliban fought pitched battles in North Waziristan during October 2007. The government pushed for a peace deal at the end of October and the fighting waned. An official peace agreement was signed in February 2008.

Swat & Shangla, October 2007 - January 2008:

The Pakistani military launched an operation to retake the settled district of Swat after Mullah Fazlullah forces overran police stations and paramilitary outposts. The Taliban were fought off to a certain extent but the government never took full control over the district. The resort was burned down this week, while the government signed a peace agreement with the Taliban in May.

South Waziristan, January - February 2008:

Heavy fighting between the Taliban and the military flared up in late January after the military launched yet another offensive to dislodge the extremists from entrenched positions. The military has pulled back to bases on the outskirts of South Waziristan.

Orakzai and Kohat, January 2008:

In Orakzai, Pakistani troops halted an offensive after a peace jirga, or committee, requested the suspension of operations. The government is currently negotiating a peace agreement with the Taliban in Kohat.

Khyber, June 2008

This effort may just be the last in a line of failed Pakistani efforts against the Taliban.

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War

Graphic source: Astarte.com

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. C. Forster Smith.

Thucydides is the most important source we have for the Peloponnesian War. Once Athens became the predominant power in the Delian League others outside Athens resented their domination. Before long, the Greek world was split into two rival camps. To counter the Delian League, Sparta and other enemies of Athens formed the Peloponnesian League. In 431 B.C.E., warfare broke out between Athens and Sparta. This conflict, which became known as the Peloponnesian War, soon engulfed all of Greece for the next 27 years.

Sparta Defeats Athens

Despite its riches and the most powerful navy of the era, Athens faced a serious geographic disadvantage. Because Sparta was inland, Athens could not use its navy to attack. And Sparta’s powerful army could simply march north to attack Athens and decimate the countryside and its crops. When the Spartan troops came near, Pericles allowed people from the countryside to move inside the city walls. However, the cramped and overcrowded conditions led to a mysterious and terrible plague that killed many Athenians, including Pericles himself.

As the war dragged on, Thucydides reports that each side committed savage acts and atrocities. Eventually, Sparta allied itself with Persia, the former and longtime enemy of the Greeks. At its conclusion, in 404 B.C.E., Sparta with the help of the Persian navy captured Athens. The victors stripped the Athenians of their fleet and empire but did not decimate Athens.

Greek Dominion Declines

The Peloponnesian War ended Athenian domination of the Greek world but Athens proved to be more resiliant and did not collapse completely. The Athenian economy eventually revived and Athens remained the cultural center of Greece and its heritage continued into the Roman era. However, at least some of its lustre and vitality declined allowing a new power, from Macedonia, a kingdom to the north of Greece, arose.

Thucydides reports a classic statement of the defence of democracy and with Pericles' funeral, the golden age of Athens ends.

The Funeral Oration of Pericles

In this passage from Thucydides' History, the Athenians have gathered to bury their warriors fallen in the first battles with Sparta. According to custom, Pericles, Athens' most respected statesman and general, a "man of approved wisdom and eminent reputation," is chosen to give the funeral oration. In his eulogy, Pericles strives to rally the spirits of his countrymen by contrasting Athenian enlightenment with the narrow militaristic ethos of its enemies.

Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; we are rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration favours the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if no social standing, advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbour for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as regard the protection of the injured, whether they are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which, although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace.

Further, we provide plenty of means for the mind to refresh itself from business. We celebrate games and sacrifices all the year round, and the elegance of our private establishments forms a daily source of pleasure and helps to banish the spleen; while the magnitude of our city draws the produce of the world into our harbour, so that to the Athenian the fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury as those of his own.

If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our antagonists. We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing, although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality; trusting less in system and policy than to the native spirit of our citizens; while in education, where our rivals from their very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at Athens we live exactly as we please, and yet are just as ready to encounter every legitimate danger. In proof of this it may be noticed that the Lacedaemonians do not invade our country alone, but bring with them all their confederates; while we Athenians advance unsupported into the territory of a neighbour, and fighting upon a foreign soil usually vanquish with ease men who are defending their homes. Our united force was never yet encountered by any enemy, because we have at once to attend to our marine and to dispatch our citizens by land upon a hundred different services; so that, wherever they engage with some such fraction of our strength, a success against a detachment is magnified into a victory over the nation, and a defeat into a reverse suffered at the hands of our entire people. And yet if with habits not of labour but of ease, and courage not of art but of nature, we are still willing to encounter danger, we have the double advantage of escaping the experience of hardships in anticipation and of facing them in the hour of need as fearlessly as those who are never free from them.

Nor are these the only points in which our city is worthy of admiration. We cultivate refinement without extravagance and knowledge without effeminacy; wealth we employ more for use than for show, and place the real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but in declining the struggle against it. Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, regarding him who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, and, instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all. Again, in our enterprises we present the singular spectacle of daring and deliberation, each carried to its highest point, and both united in the same persons; although usually decision is the fruit of ignorance, hesitation of reflection. But the palm of courage will surely be adjudged most justly to those, who best know the difference between hardship and pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from danger. In generosity we are equally singular, acquiring our friends by conferring, not by receiving, favours. Yet, of course, the doer of the favour is the firmer friend of the two, in order by continued kindness to keep the recipient in his debt; while the debtor feels less keenly from the very consciousness that the return he makes will be a payment, not a free gift. And it is only the Athenians, who, fearless of consequences, confer their benefits not from calculations of expediency, but in the confidence of liberality.

In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas, while I doubt if the world can produce a man who, where he has only himself to depend upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a versatility, as the Athenian. And that this is no mere boast thrown out for the occasion, but plain matter of fact, the power of the state acquired by these habits proves. For Athens alone of her contemporaries is found when tested to be greater than her reputation, and alone gives no occasion to her assailants to blush at the antagonist by whom they have been worsted, or to her subjects to question her title by merit to rule. Rather, the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be ours, since we have not left our power without witness, but have shown it by mighty proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist, or other of his craft whose verses might charm for the moment only for the impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere, whether for evil or for good, have left imperishable monuments behind us. Such is the Athens for which these men, in the assertion of their resolve not to lose her, nobly fought and died; and well may every one of their survivors be ready to suffer in her cause.

Indeed if I have dwelt at some length upon the character of our country, it has been to show that our stake in the struggle is not the same as theirs who have no such blessings to lose, and also that the panegyric of the men over whom I am now speaking might be by definite proofs established. That panegyric is now in a great measure complete; for the Athens that I have celebrated is only what the heroism of these and their like have made her, men whose fame, unlike that of most Hellenes, will be found to be only commensurate with their deserts. And if a test of worth be wanted, it is to be found in their closing scene, and this not only in cases in which it set the final seal upon their merit, but also in those in which it gave the first intimation of their having any. For there is justice in the claim that steadfastness in his country's battles should be as a cloak to cover a man's other imperfections; since the good action has blotted out the bad, and his merit as a citizen more than outweighed his demerits as an individual. But none of these allowed either wealth with its prospect of future enjoyment to unnerve his spirit, or poverty with its hope of a day of freedom and riches to tempt him to shrink from danger. No, holding that vengeance upon their enemies was more to be desired than any personal blessings, and reckoning this to be the most glorious of hazards, they joyfully determined to accept the risk, to make sure of their vengeance, and to let their wishes wait; and while committing to hope the uncertainty of final success, in the business before them they thought fit to act boldly and trust in themselves. Thus choosing to die resisting, rather than to live submitting, they fled only from dishonour, but met danger face to face, and after one brief moment, while at the summit of their fortune, escaped, not from their fear, but from their glory.

So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must determine to have as unfaltering a resolution in the field, though you may pray that it may have a happier issue. And not contented with ideas derived only from words of the advantages which are bound up with the defence of your country, though these would furnish a valuable text to a speaker even before an audience so alive to them as the present, you must yourselves realize the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon her from day to day, till love of her fills your hearts; and then, when all her greatness shall break upon you, you must reflect that it was by courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling of honour in action that men were enabled to win all this, and that no personal failure in an enterprise could make them consent to deprive their country of their valour, but they laid it at her feet as the most glorious contribution that they could offer. For this offering of their lives made in common by them all they each of them individually received that renown which never grows old, and for a sepulchre, not so much that in which their bones have been deposited, but that noblest of shrines wherein their glory is laid up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion on which deed or story shall call for its commemoration. For heroes have the whole earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where the column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every breast a record unwritten with no tablet to preserve it, except that of the heart. These take as your model and, judging happiness to be the fruit of freedom and freedom of valour, never decline the dangers of war. For it is not the miserable that would most justly be unsparing of their lives; these have nothing to hope for: it is rather they to whom continued life may bring reverses as yet unknown, and to whom a fall, if it came, would be most tremendous in its consequences. And surely, to a man of spirit, the degradation of cowardice must be immeasurably more grievous than the unfelt death which strikes him in the midst of his strength and patriotism!

Comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have to offer to the parents of the dead who may be here. Numberless are the chances to which, as they know, the life of man is subject; but fortunate indeed are they who draw for their lot a death so glorious as that which has caused your mourning, and to whom life has been so exactly measured as to terminate in the happiness in which it has been passed. Still I know that this is a hard saying, especially when those are in question of whom you will constantly be reminded by seeing in the homes of others blessings of which once you also boasted: for grief is felt not so much for the want of what we have never known, as for the loss of that to which we have been long accustomed. Yet you who are still of an age to beget children must bear up in the hope of having others in their stead; not only will they help you to forget those whom you have lost, but will be to the state at once a reinforcement and a security; for never can a fair or just policy be expected of the citizen who does not, like his fellows, bring to the decision the interests and apprehensions of a father. While those of you who have passed your prime must congratulate yourselves with the thought that the best part of your life was fortunate, and that the brief span that remains will be cheered by the fame of the departed. For it is only the love of honour that never grows old; and honour it is, not gain, as some would have it, that rejoices the heart of age and helplessness.

Turning to the sons or brothers of the dead, I see an arduous struggle before you. When a man is gone, all are wont to praise him, and should your merit be ever so transcendent, you will still find it difficult not merely to overtake, but even to approach their renown. The living have envy to contend with, while those who are no longer in our path are honoured with a goodwill into which rivalry does not enter. On the other hand, if I must say anything on the subject of female excellence to those of you who will now be in widowhood, it will be all comprised in this brief exhortation. Great will be your glory in not falling short of your natural character; and greatest will be hers who is least talked of among the men, whether for good or for bad.

My task is now finished. I have performed it to the best of my ability, and in word, at least, the requirements of the law are now satisfied. If deeds be in question, those who are here interred have received part of their honours already, and for the rest, their children will be brought up till manhood at the public expense: the state thus offers a valuable prize, as the garland of victory in this race of valour, for the reward both of those who have fallen and their survivors. And where the rewards for merit are greatest, there are found the best citizens.

And now that you have brought to a close your lamentations for your relatives, you may depart."

Source: Richart Crawley, Translator.

Thucydides states that Athenian democracy adheres to both law and custom which ensures harmonious relationships. Others who see the benefits of Athens are attracted to the city. In military affairs, Athens citizens act freely and as a city-state Athens acts unilaterally. Discussion and debate permit Athenians to act more openly and freer than in other cities. These habits strengthen the state and in need of no one to merely boast about these accomplishments. The character of the country is such that it produces individuals willing to struggle or even to die for its glory. The survivors should have the same resolve and hold steadfast as the dead did. Pericles comforts those who survive knowing their progeny had such resolve and those who can have more children are to do so. The living, male and female, are to live up to their best character. There are rewards for the glory of the dead and the state assists those related to the dead.

As important as Thucydides is, the difficulty for the layperson to grasp him and understand his work, is to overcome certain limitations in his presentation of the war. Robert Strassler's supplemental edition provides resources by providing a commentary of the narrative, and the necessary background of an easily misunderstood cultural tradition that we do not share in order to provide a useful context for modern readers. The work is amply bolstered by a plethora of unique maps, substantive appendices by leading classical scholars, such as Victor Davis Hanson, explanatory marginalia, and a helpful and complete index. Thucydides is much more easily understood by using this volume.

Along with using Robert Strassler's, The Landmark Thucydides, while reading the original text in translation, Donald Kagan's, The Peloponnesian War, is a masterpiece of elucidation. The text is clear and well-written while expounding on the War mostly covered by Thucydides. Kagan also is supplemented by maps not available in Strassler that I found extremely helpful to understand Thucydides while imagining the personalities involved, such as Alcibiades, the terrain, and battle conditions. This is a masterful one-volume work for general readers of the period which is much more than a simple summary of his four-volume corpus for specialists published by Cornell University Press.

Unfortunately for us, and most distressing for Thucydides, is that he died before the conclusion of the War and his account is supplemented by others. The Portable Greek Historian by M.I. Finley does not contain his Hellenica, Xenophon's account of the War, but Plutarch's, The Rise and Fall of Athens, does include important biographical and historical details about leading actors such as Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lysander. Although living long after the dates in question, in the first century of the Common Era, Plutarch nonetheless reliably reveals important aspects of the participants lives.

At a time when democracy is threatened worldwide, Thucydides is critical reading to understand contemporary questions.

What is the nature of a democracy during warfare?

Are democracies well-equipped to engage in warfare or does the liberal nature of democracy limit its war-making capabilities against martial states?

Does chronic warfare lead to tyranny?

One of the basic questions to consider is whether democracies have the same decisiveness and strength of character that martial states have. Isn't the resolve of democracies weaker in that once confronted with casualties, in a democracy people object to the destruction, and therefore their resolve is weakened? Pericles seems to imply the opposite. He argues that the people should hold steadfast while those who willingly fought gained glory and performed their duty. Pericles argues that it is the freedom of individuals that produces people of good character in a democratic state.

Thucydides is aware that chronic warfare led to tyranny in Athens. The Athenian democracy was overthrown by the oligarchy. Between the machinations of The Four Hundred and The Five Thousand, democracy was only belatedly, and with great difficulty, restored in Athens. Democracy is fragile and requires vigilance.

However, only specific, complex societies offer a possibility of eliminating tyranny. Eli Sagan, in his At the Dawn of Tyranny, draws from what he describes as "complex societies," i.e., pre-literate states, such as the Buganda of what is today Uganda, and pre-Europeanized Polynesian societies. No matter what advances were made by Greece or Mohammed, or any number of states from countless places and periods, Sagan states: "It is only with the emergence of democratic political forms that the eradication of various forms of oppression has become an ideal and a possibility of society. . . . Somehow, in only one part of the world--in Western Europe--deep within tyrannical society, the forms developed that made democratic life possible" (p. 297).

Peshawar Chickens Home to Roost

Peshawar Graphic source: The New York Times

In an `I told you so' type of situation, Taliban militants have threatened to envelop a city of three million, one of Pakistan’s largest, in Peshawar. As the militants strike fear into the city, Pakistan's lukewarm battle against the Taliban comes home to roost. NATO and the Coalition have long argued that this lawless, tribal region was close to collapse and as the major supply route for weapons the area is crucial to hold. The situation is even more grim considering that there still may be unaccounted for nuclear weapons held somewhere nearby. Peshawar is just 90 minutes by highway from Islamabad, the Pakistani capital, and with this latest move the Taliban demonstrate just how severe the threat is on both sides of the border with Afghanistan.

Peshawar has long been a semi-autonomous region anyway. In the 1980s, Americans used the city as a staging base for the mujahedeen, the Islamic fighters supplied by Washington to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Bin Laden arrived in 1985 to assist the mujahedeen, and almost exactly 20 years ago, in 1988, bin Laden held meetings at a house here that gave birth to Al Qaeda, according to The bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century by Steve Coll.

This lawless region exists as a menagerie of Taliban and al-Qaeda elements according to a survey of nearby towns.

To the south is Darra Adam Khel where forces of the Tehrik-e-Taliban of Pakistan, an umbrella group of Taliban, took virtual control of the city.

The group is led by Baitullah Mehsud, who is accused by the Pakistani government of masterminding the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

Rivalries between Mehsud's movement and Haji Namdar who runs a Taliban group called the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice. This Taliban faction enforces a strict version of sharia, or Islamic law. Namdar called for Mehsud's supporters in Khyber to leave the region after a suicide bomber targeted his headquarters in Bara. Twenty of Namdar's supporters were wounded in the attack, which was carried out by the Hakeemullah Group. Hakeemullah Mehsud, Baitullah’s deputy, took credit for the attack.

To the east, Mangal Bagh leads Lashkar-i-Islam and he claims to have 180,000 fighters under his command. Lashkar-e-Islam has fought pitched battles with Ansar-ul-Islam, a rival group.

To the north, Tehrik-e-Taliban established a prison in Michini and in Warsak, the Taliban have constructed a training camp.

In Shabqadar, a few miles away, the Taliban turned up in the central square and posted a notice urging people to contact them rather than the courts to settle their disputes.

The techniques of fear and intimidation are similar to those used in Afghanistan during the 1990s, when the Taliban emerged after the retreat of the Soviets and the end of American financing. The Taliban generally ally themselves with the local criminals. The Taliban either attack criminals which wins them favor with the local or they coopt the criminals to further intimidate or hold the local populace in check. The Taliban are joined by the local criminals who grow their hair and their beards to fit in neatly with the Taliban. In this symbiotic manner, the Taliban and criminals join together as the criminals get protection from the militants for the money they give to the Taliban from their extortion rackets.

The Taliban are forward-thinking in that they abduct young boys and demand that they become jihadists rather than sit idly at home.

The counter-offensive by the Pakistani government has provided "full authority" to General Pervaiz Kayani, the Army Chief of Staff, to conduct operations to secure Peshawar.

Kiyani is viewed as one of the toughest officers in Pakistan and graduated near the top of his class at CGSC (Command General Staff College) at Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a highly regarded tactician and intellectual. The CGSC is where the 'cream of the crop' from overseas attend. Kiyani is also likely to have forged close bonds with his military counterparts in the Coalition/NATO. He is also a former head of the unreliable ISI in 2004 but thus may actually oppose its disloyal members. It was during Kiyani's ISI tenure that the agency arrested AQ’s most wanted chief operational commander, Abu Faraj Libbi, who had allegedly masterminded the Rawalpindi assassination attempts on Musharraf’s life amongst other insurgent actions. However, in balance it was during his administration that the Taliban staged a comeback in the tribal areas of Pakistan thus enabling AQ to establish its sanctuaries in the Waziristan region on the Pak-Afghan border. He possibly could come through though.

Cf. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/28/world/asia/28pstan.html?ei=5087&em=&en=848ef5383b36b99f&ex=1214798400&pagewanted=all;
Cf. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/06/pakistan_strikes_at_1.php;
Cf. http://thepost.com.pk/OpinionNews.aspx?dtlid=121794&catid=11.

Italy Gets a Piece of Gas in Iraq

The Iraqi State Company for Natural Gas has agreed with Omica, an Italian company, to construct Iraq's largest factory for repairing natural gas valves in the province of Thi-Qar. The factory is scheduled to be set up this year. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil has opened eight new departments affiliated with the company in the provinces of Najaf, Karbala, Diala, Ramadi, Muthanna, Wassit, Thi-Qar, and Missan.