Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat by Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Senior Intelligence Analysts at the NYPD Intelligence Division, provides sobering reading.
The authors state: "There is no useful profile to assist law enforcement or intelligence to predict who will follow this trajectory of radicalization. Rather, the individuals who take this course begin as `unremarkable' from various walks of life."
A radical is not born with horns on their head but the authors conclude, based on foreign and U.S. examples that a process of radicalization takes place for the eventual jihadists. Although Europe has been hit, and homegrown U.S. radicals have largetly been thwarted, the danger remains. They state:
Despite the economic opportunities in the United States, the powerful gravitational pull of individuals’ religious roots and identity sometimes supersedes ghe assimilating nature of American society which includes pursuit of a professional career, financial stability and material comforts.
The implications for homegrown radicalization make the efforts of law enforcement extremely difficult.
They conclude:
The global jihadi-Salafi movement poses a significant challenge to law enforcement and intelligence since the radicalization phenomenon that drives it is spontaneous, indiscriminate, and its indicators are subtle. Identifying whether an individual is being radicalized is hard to detect, especially in the early stages.
How is law enforcement to determine when and if simply radical talk is just that, talk? But this stage is when an individual may be stopped before they actually commit any violence.
•The individuals are not on the law enforcement radar. Most have never been arrested or involved in any kind of legal trouble. Other than some commonalities in age and religion, individuals undergoing radicalization appear as `ordinary' citizens, who look, act, talk, and walk like everyone around them. In fact, in the United Kingdom, it is precisely those `ordinary' middle class university students who are sought after by local extremists because they are `clean skins'.
None of these types of people would attract any attention. They look like any other pod.
The authors continue:
•In the early stages of their radicalization, these individuals rarely travel, are not participating in any kind of militant activity, yet they are slowly building the mindset, intention, and commitment to conduct jihad.
As evidenced by all eleven case studies these groups, or clusters of extremists:
"Act autonomously, can radicalize quickly, and often are made up of individuals, who on the surface, appear to be well-integrated into society."
They may be spontaneous which makes detection difficult. Silber and Bhatt state that the jihadists:
Are not “name brand” terrorists or part of any known terrorist group. For the most part, they have little or no links to known militant groups or actors. Rather they are like-minded individuals who spend time together in clusters organized, originally, by previously established social network links.
They are not engaged in activities which would get them noticed because they "Are not crime syndicates and therefore, applying organized crime strategies will fail."
Finally, the authors conclude:
The challenge to intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the West in general, and the United States in particular, is how to identify, pre-empt and thus prevent homegrown terrorist attacks given the non-criminal element of its indicators, the high growth rate of the process that underpins it and the increasing numbers of its citizens that are exposed to it.
These are sobering words. Americans have to be vigilant but respectful of privacy and American liberties. This is a difficult path to follow when the threat is real, it is here, and it is covert.
As the Middle East has gone, so has Europe, as Europe has gone, so has New York City, as NYC goes, so goes the U.S. The threat is real; the threat is here.